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During the last decade, the growth rate of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from
developing and transition economies has been outpacing that from developed economies.
Their investment in other developing countries represents a burgeoning instance of South-
South cooperation. The three essays in this dissertation examine the key issues and poten-
tial challenges of South-South FDI.
The first chapter observes the growing importance of South-South FDI flows. With the
drying up of outward FDI flows from developed countries since the financial crisis, the
importance of investment from other developing countries increased and accounted for
an estimated 34% of the world’s outward FDI in 2010, compared with 25% in 2007. A large
share of outward FDI stock from developing and transition economies is concentrated in
the services sector. The nature of multinational companies (MNCs) is also changing with
an increasing number of countries in developing and transition economies hosting such
companies. When Southern MNCs invest abroad, they rarely have access to proprietary
assets such as technology, financial capital, brands, and technical know-how. They are
able to catch up with Northern MNCs through strategic and organizational innovations.
They have greater access to network capital suitable for developing country markets. This
network capital might include information on supply lines, local financing, local tastes,
bureaucratic procedures, minimizing transaction costs, and other local idiosyncracies. The
establishment size of Southern MNCs tends to be on average much smaller than the es-
tablishment size of Northern MNCs. Southern establishments are also comparatively less
productive and tend to pay lower wages than Northern establishments.
Until recently, the parsimonious explanation for the scarcity of capital flows to devel-
oping countries ranged from human capital to institutional risk. Although the expected
return on investment might be high in many developing countries, it does not flow there
because of the high level of uncertainty associated with those expected returns. The second
chapter sheds light on the question to what extent the alternative explanations of Lucas
paradox holds particularly for South-South FDI. Using a bilateral panel data set, I estimate
an augmented gravity model using the Poisson pseudo-likelihood estimator. The empir-
ical evidence suggests that per capita income, human capital, and average institutional
quality are not important variables explaining South-South FDI. Asymmetric information
as proxied by the weighted distance variable is highly significant. Southern MNCs under-
invest in markets that are remote and where access to network capital and accurate and
timely local information is difficult. Southern MNCs require network capital and local
host country information to overcome their disadvantage in proprietary assets. Therefore,
information asymmetry may be a greater concern to Southern MNCs than human capital
or institutional risk. Lastly, South-South FDI is also more sensitive to natural resource
endowments and regional free trade agreements than North-South FDI.
Recently policymakers in developing countries have encouraged South FDI as a means
to encourage productivity growth and technology transfer. However, Southern MNCs
seldom have proprietary assets that foster positive externalities and contribute to produc-
tivity spillovers. Chapter 3 investigates the contribution of Southern FDI in enhancing effi-
ciency in Rwanda. Based on a sample of 6,707 private sector firms, the quantile regression
technique is employed. By estimating quantile regressions, I am able to test for differences
in productivity and productivity spillovers by North and South FDI across the productivity
conditional distribution. The results suggest that productivity in Rwanda is improved with
the entry of both North and South FDI. However, the effect North FDI on productivity is
stronger than that of South FDI. Moreover, productivity spillovers stemming from South
FDI are limited to low productivity local firms, which suggests that any efforts to attract
South FDI should take into account the policy objectives of an economy as well as the firm
productivity distribution involved.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
THE ANATOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT FROM THE SOUTH
1.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) serves as one of the main vectors of globalization that
has grown in importance over the past decade (Jones, 2005). The growth of FDI has
overshadowed that of trade flows in the globalization period. FDI remains the largest
component of gross capital inflows. The surge in FDI over the years has not been matched
by a corresponding surge in portfolio equity or debt flows (see Figure 1.1). 1 Multinational
corporations (MNCs) have played a major role in the economic transformation of devel-
oping countries over the past two decades. FDI has provided developing countries with a
substantial infusion of capital, technical know-how, and new technology from abroad. FDI
creates a more competitive goods market and forces domestic capital markets to function
with greater efficiency (Calvo & Frenkel, 1991). In terms of macroeconomic stabilization,
the inflow of capital generated by FDI improves the balance of payments position of the
host country and expedites debt repayment (McMillan, 1993).2
Moreover, the inflow of FDI may prevent a “brain drain” from low-income countries,
as greater levels of physical capital enable these countries to utilize their relatively high
level of human capital more efficiently. The increases in FDI have contributed to positive
externalities leading to spillovers benefiting developing country firms. In this process,
developing country firms have amassed the necessary capital, knowledge, and know-how
to invest in other developing countries. This rise of South-South FDI from developing
1There was a broad decline in gross capital inflows across asset types during the 2010–15 slowdown.
However, gross outflows across all asset types increased, except for the sharp reversal in 2015. Changes
in gross capital inflows and outflows were more pronounced for debt-generating flows than for equity-like
flows.
2In the short and medium run, FDI subsidiaries often import equipment from the parent company, which
may result in trade deficits until the subsidiaries begin exporting.
2countries to other developing countries represents a significant reversal from the one-way
flow of foreign capital from North to South. South-South FDI has grown five times faster
than conventional North-South investment (Margolis, 2006). In 2013, there were 9 devel-
oping country MNCs among the 100 largest MNCs in the world as measured by foreign
assets (UNCTAD, 2014; see Table 1.1).
The earliest sources of South FDI dates back to the pioneering experience of Argentine
firms operating in neighboring countries as early as in 1910 (Kosacoff, 2001). There were
also about 100 pre-World War II Chinese firms operating abroad (Aykut & Goldstein,
2006). It is only since the late 1980s that an increasing number of developing countries and
transition economies, including China, India, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia, and Turkey
have become significant sources of outward FDI. Since the early 2000s, the growth rate
of outward FDI from the South has outpaced the growth from the North. South FDI
accounts for 34% of global outward FDI in 2014, up from 16% in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2014; see
Figure 1.2). The surge in South-South FDI has motivated low-income countries to increase
efforts to attract foreign investors. FDI from the South presents an opportunity to take
advantage of new wealth and investment within the countries of the South, to mobilize it
for further benefit of low-income countries, and in the process to further bolster Southern
solidarity, empowerment, and development.
For a long time, South-South investment has remained a peripheral issue in the FDI
literature. Since the earliest studies of Lecraw (1977) and Wells (1983), South FDI attracted
interest from only a few academics or policymakers. Insofar as South FDI has become a
permanent and sizeable feature of the global economy, it can no longer be ignored. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to some of the key issues regarding
South-South FDI. We begin by examining the size, nature, and trends in South-South FDI.
I pay particular attention to potential pitfalls of estimating South-South FDI flows. Then I
explore the conceptual motivations and framework of South-South FDI. Lastly, I examine
the establishment level differences between South-South FDI and the conventional North-
South FDI.
An important purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of South-
South investment flows. The findings highlight that the trend of South FDI will continue
in the years ahead. Developing countries in Asia are the largest contributor to South FDI.
3Conventional wisdom argues that a significant part of growth of FDI from the South has
recently been driven by investment in natural resources. Interestingly, a large share of out-
ward FDI stock from developing and transition economies is concentrated in the services
sector. Moreover, prima facie evidence indicates that Southern MNCs are fundamentally
dissimilar to Northern MNCs. Southern MNCs face a disadvantage in access to resources
and proprietary assets. However, they have greater familiarity with business practices
suitable for developing country markets. This familiarity gives them some advantage
over Northern MNCs when investing in a developing country. Lastly, Southern MNCs
are much smaller than Northern MNCs. They tend to have fewer employees and lower
productivity. They also have a lower capital-labor ratio than Northern MNCs.
Understanding the role of the South as a source of FDI is useful for several reasons.
First, the growing importance of South-South FDI flows indicates that developing coun-
tries are more financially integrated with one another than previously believed. Second,
South-South FDI may follow cycles different from the ones followed by North-South FDI.
For example, the relative resilience of the FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa region is partly
supported by the rise of South-South investment particularly from Asian countries such
as China, Malaysia, and India. Southern MNCs have lower overhead costs and possess
more expertise in dealing with imperfect institutions (Dixit, 2012; Wells, 1983). Finally, the
expansion of South-South FDI may require countries to implement investment promotion
policies that target MNCs from the South.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 operationalizes the definition of the “South”
and describes data limitations. Section 2.3 describes the trends in South-South FDI. Section
2.4 examines the motivations and strategies that Southern MNCs have pursued. Section 2.5
presents the establishment-level characteristics of Southern MNCs. Section 2.6 concludes.
1.2 Definition and some notes on data
Before I proceed, a few caveats that have a bearing on the analyses and how they
will be addressed are in order. The caveats relate to definitional and measurement issues,
terminology used, and systematic bias.
41.2.1 Definition of the “South”
It is difficult to operationalize the definition of “South.” There is no single definition
of “North” and “South.” The terms “North” and “South” have been used casually in the
literature to denote the developed countries and the developing countries, respectively.
The definition of North used in this dissertation follows the UNCTAD (2005) country
classification. The donor countries belonging to the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) plus Greece and Ireland are classified here as being in the North. Conversely,
UNCTAD (2005) included Hong Kong (China), the Republic of Korea, and Singapore in
the South, even though they are now net contributors to the World Bank Group and are
no longer eligible for loans. The definition of South follows the UNCTAD (2005) country
classification, which includes both developing countries and economies in transition. It is
important to bear in mind these differences in composition.
1.2.2 Underreporting of FDI
Outward FDI from developing and transition economies may be underreported. Some
developing countries do not identify outward FDI flows in their balance of payments
statistics. Moreover, underreporting of outward FDI flows is pervasive, in particular, when
MNCs attempt to avoid capital and exchange controls or evade taxes on the investment
income. These problems stem from lax accounting standards and weak tax administration.
There may be conceptual problems in identifying outward FDI. A foreign investor requires
a 10% or more of equity ownership to qualify as foreign direct investor. It may be easier for
a host country to determine whether a particular equity investment meets this criterion.
As a result, the criterion may cause underreporting of outward FDI flows in the source
country.
Inward FDI flows are also often underreported by host countries. Until recently, many
countries did not observe the standard definition of FDI proposed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Balance of Payments Manual. For example, India’s FDI
statistics excluded reinvested earnings, intracompany loans from the parent companies
to foreign affiliates, and investments by offshore and equity funds set up by foreigners
(Unit, 2002). As the government of India adopted the IMF’s definition of FDI, in 2003,
it revised its inward FDI statistics upwards by more than $1 trillion. Indonesia’s inward
5FDI may also be underreported. Indonesia excluded reinvested earnings as FDI inflows.
Over the course of 1998 to 2001, Indonesia’s inward FDI flows were underreported and
disinvestments (negative FDI flows) overreported.
1.2.3 Round-tripping of FDI
Many countries have embarked upon a series of policies aimed at attracting FDI. Some
of these policies provide monetary incentives for foreign investors, including special and
preferential treatment in taxation and a lax regulatory environment. The preferential treat-
ment provides domestic investors the incentive to take capital across the boder and bring it
back as inward FDI. For example, capital may exit the country in the form of bank deposits
and return as FDI inflows. If round-tripping involves another developing country, then
such flows would be included in estimates of South-South FDI, even though there is no
net inflow into the developing country concerned. Most countries do not have consistent
reporting on round-tripping, in which case it can affect the estimation of South-South FDI.
Let us consider the case of round-tripping between China and Hong Kong (SAR).
Chinese FDI inflows surged during the 1990s in response to market reforms and incen-
tives for FDI. The incentives included tax concessions, sovereign guarantees, and special
arrangements on exchange controls. The preferential treatment is believed to have encour-
aged Chinese firms to move money offshore and bring it back to China disguised as FDI
(Lardy, 1995; Sicular, 1998). For example, Chinese FDI inflows from Hong Kong (SAR)
constituted nearly half of total FDI flows in 1996. The share declined to less than 40%
by 2000 as Hong Kong (SAR) was repatriated to China. However, the decline was offset
by a proportionate increase in FDI inflows from the British Virgin Islands. Some earlier
studies have provided evidence that the FDI inflows from Hong Kong (SAR) and British
Virgin Islands are highly correlated with outflows from China - mostly bank deposits held
abroad by Chinese residents and errors and omissions in China’s balance of payments.
1.2.4 Routing FDI through offshore financial centers
Capital outflows from offshore financial centers may be underreported in UNCTAD’s
World Investment Reports. Consider the US FDI statistics that distinguish between the
two criteria: (a) residence of the firm and (b) the residence of the owners of a firm. For
example, US FDI inflows from Switzerland were $56 billion in 2001. However, when the
6residence of the owners was considered, FDI from Switzerland was close to zero. A large
proportion of the investments reported as FDI from Switzerland actually originated in a
third country and was channeled through Switzerland. Offshore financial centers may
likely distort South-South FDI flows. An identical issue faced by the South-South FDI is
when the North FDI is routed through locations in the South. Consider a case in which a
US affiliate located in China undertakes FDI in Vietnam. It is difficult to separate this effect
in the estimates of South-South FDI.
1.3 What are the trends?
South’s outward FDI stock has grown rapidly in the past 15 years (UNCTAD, 2006).
The outward FDI stock from the South grew from $147 billion in 1990 to over $5 trillion in
2014 (for details, see Figure 1.1),. The increase in outward FDI flows has followed a similar
trajectory. South’s average outward FDI flows was a little above $41 billion per year over
the 1990s. It grew to $166 billion per year over the following decade. Developing and
transition economies together accounted for 21% of the world’s outward FDI stock in 2014,
compared with 6% in 1990. Hong Kong (SAR), China, and Brazil had the largest outward
FDI stock in 2014 (see Table 1.1). Most of these investments went to other developing
countries. The outward FDI from transition economies has been languishing. Firms head-
quartered in transition economies have only recently become outward investors, though
their presence has increased in Western Europe ever since the May 2004 EU enlargement.
Among developing and transition economies, those in Asia remain by far the largest source
of South FDI. Asia accounts for more than two-thirds of the South’s outward FDI stock.
The trend is primarily driven by China, Hong Kong (SAR), and Singapore.
The recent global financial crisis had reduced developing countries’ outward invest-
ment in 2009, when FDI declined by 28% to $149 billion following a record $207 billion in
2008. Despite its severity, that decline was significantly below the 45% drop in FDI flows
from developed countries. These sharp declines may reflect MNCs reliance on interna-
tional debt markets to finance their overseas expansions and the drying up of international
capital markets. Outward FDI from developed countries did not expand as rapidly as FDI
from developing countries and as a result the share of developing country in global FDI
outflows reached 18%, almost double the 10% average of the previous 3 years.
7Outward FDI flows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) are con-
siderably higher than the world average for such economies as Hong Kong (SAR), Taiwan
(SAR), the Russian Federation, and Singapore. A large proportion of the FDI inflows into
developing countries originated from regional countries.3 Many Southern MNCs invest
regionally and in other developing countries before they invest beyond their immediate
region. They have a tendency to invest close to their home country and in countries where
they have a certain familiarity through trade, or ethnic and cultural ties. Intraregional
FDI accounts for almost half of the total flows to Asia. MNCs from India and China
have been particularly active in other Asian countries. Turkey has also been actively
investing regionally, particularly in West and Central Asia. Intra-ASEAN FDI inflows
are the second largest source of FDI in the subregion. Of the $136 billion FDI inflows in
ASEAN, Intra-ASEAN FDI accounted for $24 billion, equivalent to a share of 18%. ASEAN
has accounted for about 17% on average of the region’s total FDI inflows from 2008 to 2014.
Latin America is also a significant source of intraregional FDI. MNCs from Chile, Brazil,
and Argentina have expanded their operations mainly in other developing countries in
the region. Among African countries, South Africa is responsible for well over 40% of the
total inward FDI of many sub-Saharan African countries. South African investments in
other developing countries are almost completely in the southern part of Africa. South
Africa has a significant FDI footprint in Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland. The Russian investments abroad have primarily been in
the countries of the former Soviet Union. The interregional FDI goes primarily from Asia
to Africa. China, India, and Malaysia are among the top 10 contributors to inward FDI in
Africa (UNCTAD, 2011). The second largest interregional FDI flow is from Latin America
to Asia. FDI flows between Asia and Latin America have remained modest over the years.
In recent years, Arab MNCs have also contributed to outward FDI flows. Most of their
investment is in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
Data on South-South FDI by sector are problematic. There is a large discrepancy be-
tween approved and realized FDI. Data on FDI projects depend on the nature of the
FDI regulatory regime. For example, in Thailand there is no requirement for foreign
3Not many developing countries provide a geographical breakdown of destinations of FDI outflows. Data
limitations prevent a precise calculation of the magnitude of such flows.
8investors to go through any government screening process to invest in the country. As
a result, official records grossly understate FDI in Thailand. With these caveats, a sectoral
breakdown of South-South FDI shows that investment flows are highly concentrated in
the services sector (UNCTAD, 2006). The services sector accounts more than one half of
South’s outward FDI stock. South FDI is particularly high in trade, business activities,
construction, and ICT. In the primary sector, South FDI is concentrated in agriculture and
the extractive industries. However, the share of FDI in the primary sector may decrease in
response to China’s demand shortfall and a corresponding collapse of commodity prices.
Within the manufacturing sector, the shares of Southern countries in the global outward
FDI stock are particularly high in electronics, nonmetallic mineral products, and rubber
and plastic products.
1.4 What are the motivations?
Section 1.3 demonstrated the recent trends in South-South FDI. Outward FDI from
developing and transition economies has increased rapidly in the past two decades and
represents a sizeable share of global FDI flows. The expansion of South-South FDI is
caused by the rising wealth in some developing countries that has led to capital accu-
mulation combined with capital account liberalization in other developing countries.
Several push factors motivate outward FDI. First, the objective of profit-maximizing
Southern firms is to pursue higher yields and lower risks through portfolio diversification.
However, market liberalization has eroded their protection at home, as local firms face
increased competition and limited growth opportunities. Time to market is reduced and
production runs must increase continuously to control costs. As a result, many Southern
firms have internationalized and invested in market-seeking activities in other developing
countries. Currency appreciation and increased competition have also made it difficult for
firms to maintain external competitiveness and defend their export markets (Wells, 1983).
This imbalance has driven many Southern firms to invest in efficiency-and-asset-seeking
activities overseas following an erosion of their export competitiveness (Lall, 1983; Mirza,
2000). Trade policies can also affect the incentives for Southern firms in many ways. High
tariffs and nontariff barriers may induce tariff-jumping FDI to serve the foreign market.
Moreover, as of late, many Southern firms have internationalized with the objective
9to procure the elastic supply of key raw materials and resources (Buckley, Clegg, Cross,
& Liu, 2007). The rising wealth in developing countries is concomitant with the increased
demand for raw materials. Several MNCs from the South have invested in critical interme-
diary inputs in other developing countries. As an example, consider the entry of Chinese
MNCs in pulp projects in Chile and Russia, iron ore and steel mills in Peru, and crude
oil in Angola and Sudan (Chhabra, 2001). Malaysia’s Petronas also has investments in the
extractive industries in South Africa, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Lastly, some source
country governments offer fiscal and monetary incentives to encourage outward FDI. For
example, China’s “going global” strategy promotes outward FDI by providing preferential
loans, tax rebate, and investment insurance. Malaysia has also encouraged South-South
FDI through special deals signed with countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, India,
and Tanzania. A large number of Southern firms have responded to these institutional
incentives and ventured abroad (Mirza, 2000; UNCTAD, 2002).
The major pull factor for South-South FDI includes the host country’s low produc-
tion costs and easy access to domestic and foreign markets. Other pull factors involve
familiarity with local investment climate, geographic proximity, and ethnic and cultural
linkages. It is difficult for firms to obtain accurate and timely information from abroad.
Therefore, Southern MNCs tend to invest in countries in geographical proximity, where
they may have strong cultural or ethnic ties (Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape, & Martin,
1999; Padayachee & Valodia, 1999). More recently, Southern firms have invested abroad
to achieve political objectives rather than profit maximization (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen,
Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014). For example, China’s investment in Latin America
and Africa seeks to assert its presence in countries critical to China’s long-term strategic
interests (Peters, 2015).
1.5 How do Southern firms internationalize?
The internationalization of firms in the South has become a permanent and growing
feature of the global economy. Southern MNCs are very different in size and capacity.
Forbes Magazine first released its list of the world’s largest 2000 MNCs in 2003. The list
was dominated by companies from the United States, Japan, and Great Britain. However,
in the most recent “Global 2000” list, MNCs from China and other developing countries
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feature prominently. In 2014, 674 companies came from Asia, compared with 629 from
North America and 506 from Europe. The world’s three biggest state-owned MNCs and
5 of the top 10 MNCs are Chinese. The major MNCs from developing countries include
Vale (Brazil) in mining; SABIC (Saudi Arabia) in chemicals; Sinopec (China), Petrobras
(Brazil), Petronas (Malaysia), and Indian Oil (India) in petroleum refining; Cemex (Mexico)
in cement; Hyundai and Kia (Republic of Korea) in motor vehicles; Samsung and LG
(Republic of Korea) in electronics; China Mobile (Hong Kong SAR) and MTN (South
Africa) in telecom; DP World (UAE) and Hutchison Whampoa (Singapore) in port logistics;
Teva Pharmaceuticals (Israel) in pharmaceuticals; and CITIC (China), SK (Republic of
Korea), Tata (India) and, Orascom (Egypt) across diverse set of industries.
There are several reasons firms internationalize and become MNCs. The reasons can be
wide ranging but often include a small home market, competitive pressures, and govern-
ment incentives aimed at encouraging foreign expansion. Over the past few decades, two
major schools of thought have emerged to explain the internationalization of firms. Both
schools diverged from the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory of trade (Markusen, 2004).
One school of thought that remained close to neoclassical economics introduced general
equilibrium models with restrictive assumptions to explain the emergence of MNCs. This
stream of research has moved away from perfect competition and constant returns to
models incorporating imperfect competition and economies of scale, but its focus remains
on explaining the patterns of production, consumption, and trade at the country level
rather than the firm level. The other school of thought was a departure from neoclassical
economics and introduced partial equilibrium models based on more relaxed underlying
assumptions. This stream of research is mainly interested in explaining the firm’s strategic
motivation to choose FDI over other entry modes when internationalizing. John Dunning’s
eclectic paradigm offers a widely accepted framework of this school of thought (Dunning,
1981).
Dunning (1981) explains that firms invest abroad because they enjoy certain a priori
microeconomic advantages widely associated with ownership, localization, and internal-
ization. Ownership advantage is an endogenous firm-specific characteristic. It is typically
derived from proprietary assets, such as strong brand names, superior technology, or
returns to scale, as well as by superior managerial capabilities to control and coordinate
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transactions. The proprietary assets are transferable between different units of an MNC
around the world. Location advantage is an exogenous country-specific characteristic.
It normally takes the form of immobile factor endowments that are combined with the
ownership advantages to encourage firms to produce abroad. Location advantage repre-
sents the comparative cost of intermediary inputs (e.g., raw materials, labor, and natural
resources) accessible by firms operating within that country’s borders, or by trading costs
among countries, which may include transportation costs, tariffs, and nontariff barriers.
Internalization advantages accrue when market transactions are replaced by extending
internal operation. The reason from internalization stems from the fact that proprietary
assets become a private good once transferred outside the boundaries of the firm. Inter-
nalizing advantage applies to the case in which the firm prefers to exploit its ownership
advantage internally, rather than by licensing or joint venture, in order to minimize the
transaction costs associated with the interfirm transfer of proprietary assets.
The eclectic paradigm is a prominent framework that has gained significant recogni-
tion, but it is predominantly based on the experience of developed-country MNCs. North-
ern MNCs have the proprietary assets and capabilities to expand overseas. Meanwhile,
Southern MNCs rarely have proprietary assets when they internationalize in new condi-
tions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Most Southern MNCs expand overseas with the
purpose of building advantages and proprietary assets. This proposition is reinforced by a
recent study of acquisitions in the US (W. Chen, 2011). Based on propensity score matching,
W. Chen (2011) reveals that acquisitions by MNCs from developed countries experienced
greater labor productivity relative to acquisitions by developing country MNCs. The
productivity margin suggests that investing MNCs from developed countries likely invest
to exploit their proprietary assets, whereas developing country MNCs invest to pursue
proprietary assets abroad. Mathews (2006) refers to this as the new linkage, leverage,
and learning (LLL) paradigm. The LLL paradigm was originally introduced to explain
the internationalization strategies of the MNCs from the Asia Pacific region. It was an
alternative and complementary paradigm to the dominant OLI. Southern MNCs have
leveraged their way into new markets through partnerships and joint ventures. Their
accelerated internationalization is based on latecomer advantages that lead to various
kinds of strategic and organizational innovations. They have mastered the manufacturing
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processes by accessing strategic assets and deploying low-cost engineers in innovative
ways. For example, South African commercial banks have extended mzansi accounts,
which were aimed at local low-income users, to their operations in other African countries
(Goldstein & Pritchard, 2006). Mathews (2006) argues it is the innovative features that
these MNCs share that complement the emerging global economy.
1.6 Institutional advantage of Southern multinationals
A more recent set of explanations that focuses on the institutional characteristics of
Southern MNCs has been proposed by Avinash (Dixit, 2012). He posits that Southern
MNCs have internationalized by turning initial difficulties into sources of advantage. Man-
aging a difficult regulatory and governance environment is an area in which Southern
MNCs have developed a relative advantage. The experience of operating under diffi-
cult conditions at home has equipped Southern MNCs to cope with similar conditions
elsewhere. The experience has given them an organizational advantage when invest-
ing in other countries with similar conditions and institutions. First, Southern MNCs
can better manage uncertain supply chains, unreliable power supplies, and a low-skilled
workforce. They also have experience managing regulatory bottlenecks and weak contract
enforcement. Second, Southern MNCs exploit ethnic and linguistic networks much more
effectively overseas than Northern MNCs. The importance of Chinese ethnic networks
for inward FDI to China from East and Southeast Asia is well documented (Rauch, 2001).
Chinese MNCs such as Huawei and TCL have leveraged political relations with Russia
and Vietnam and cultural affinity in Southeast Asia (E. Chen & Lin, 2008). Lastly, Southern
MNCs are not constrained by the source country laws. They are able to get around restric-
tions through informal networks. Northern MNCs are often subject to the souce country
laws and pressure from nongovernmental organizations. They face similar pressure to pay
fair wages to their workers abroad.
Dixit (2012) presents a minimalist model that formalizes internationalization of South-
ern firms based on their institutional advantage. Consider a firm contemplating investing
overseas in a country with institutional quality expressed by an inverted measure r. A
higher r corresponds to worse institutional quality. Assume that the firm has access to
superior proprietary assets over local rivals. Let l denote the ownership advantage. The
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firm faces three alternative operation modes: (a) domestic production for exports and local
consumption is denoted as Z; (b) establishment of a wholly owned subsidiary is denoted
as V; and (c) entering a joint venture with a local firm is denoted as J.
The firm faces extra costs besides production. These costs stem from coping with
imperfect institutions (c) and adapting the technology to the local conditions (a). They
are an increasing function of r and t. A local partner’s access to timely and accurate
local information can reduce these costs. For convenience, Dixit (2012) assumes a simple
functional form of these costs under the two modes V and J:
ΓV = cvr + avt, ΓJ = cjr + ajt
where cv > cj and av > aj.
The poor institutional quality may lead to the risk that the local partner imitates the
technology and then uses it to compete with its MNC partner. The leakage cost (L) is
likely zero if the host country has strong institutions (r = 0) or the MNC’s technology is
perfectly adapted to the host country’s conditions (t = 0). A simple form for the leakage
cost is as follows:
LJ = φrt
Let’s suppose the MNC’s profit is RV for a wholly owned subsidiary and RJ for a joint-
venture. We expect RV > RJ since under a joint venture, the local partner must be given a
profit share. Then the overall profits (Π) under the two modes are:
ΠV = RV − cvr− avt, ΠJ = RJ − cjr− ajt
For each (r, t) combination, the MNC will choose the entry mode that yields the highest





Figure 1.3 illustrates the results. The curves ΠV = 0, ΠJ = 0 and ΠV = ΠJ divide the
(r, t) space into regions. ΠV is positive to the left of the curve and negative to its right.
ΠJ is positive below the curve and negative above it. Lastly, ΠV > ΠJ above the curve
and ΠV < ΠJ below it. The regions in the (r, t) space are separated by curves and labeled
with the optimal entry mode. When r and t are sufficiently high, engaging in profitable
production is not possible under either entry mode. When r is low, the MNC’s optimal
entry mode is a wholly owned subsidiary as it avoids the leakage cost. When t is low,
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the local partner’s ability to better manage imperfect institutions becomes an important
consideration.
Based on this framework, Dixit (2012) compares the choices facing a Northern MNC
(N) and a Southern MNC (S) contemplating direct investment in the same developing
country. Assume that the technology used by a Southern MNC is better adapted to the
host country conditions than that of a Northern MNC. Then S will be located vertically
below N in Figure 1.3. For low r denoting relatively strong institutions in the host country,
N may postpone investment, whereas S may enter using V or J; or N may enter using V,
whereas S enters using J. For high r denoting relatively weak institutions, N may postpone
investment, whereas S may enter using J. These results broadly confirm the observations
of Wells (1983) and Lall (1983) that Southern MNCs tend to form joint ventures with local
partners.
Dixit (2012) also considers the hypothesis that Southern MNCs are better able to man-
age imperfect institutions. The experience of operating in difficult institutional conditions
at home have equipped Southern MNCs to cope with similar conditions abroad. Therefore,
Southern MNCs enjoy lower costs that stem from coping with imperfect institutions (cv).
Figure 1.4 illustrates these results. A lower cv shifts the ΠV = 0 curve to the right and the
ΠV = ΠV curve downward, which expands the region where V is the optimal entry mode.
In the region denoted as J → V, a Northern MNC would enter using mode J, whereas a
Southern MNC with its lower cv would enter using entry mode V. In this case the host
country has relatively strong institutions and where firms have access to fairly advanced
technology. In the region denoted as Z → V, a Northern MNC would decide to postpone
investment, whereas a Southern MNC would enter using entry mode V. In this case the
host country continues to have relatively strong institutions but the MNC’s technology is
not too advanced for what is appropriate for the host country.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the hypothesis that Southern MNCs have better access to a net-
work of local firms that have the experience operating locally. A lower cj shifts both curves
ΠJ = 0 and ΠV = ΠJ upward. First, in the region denoted as V → J, a Northern MNC
would enter using entry mode V, whereas a Southern MNC with its lower cj would enter
using entry mode J. The host country has relatively strong institutions in this region.
Second, in the region denoted as Z → J, a Northern MNC would decide to postpone
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investment, whereas a Southern MNC would enter using entry mode J. The host country
has relatively weak institutions in this region. Neverthless, in either case, the MNC’s
technology is not too advanced for the host country.
Dixit’s (2012) framework shows that Southern MNCs advantage abroad tends to stem
from joint ventures with local partners. Southern MNCs also rely on their skills to navigate
the difficult conditions abroad. However, their advantage may be better explained by hav-
ing access to local partners that may have access to timely and accurate local information
and network capital.
1.7 Plant-level characteristics of South multinationals
South FDI in developing countries takes on different forms and with different pur-
poses. The nature of MNCs is also changing with an increasing number of developing and
transition economies hosting such firms. I consider the average establishment sizes from
the South and the North. The establishment size is measured as the output per establish-
ment. It is important to bear in mind that the most comprehensive establishment-level
statistics available are from the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Ramstetter, 1994, 1999).
Table 1.3 presents the average size of establishments in Hong Kong, China and Singapore
in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. As Table 1.3 shows, establishments with parent
companies headquartered in the North are significantly larger than the establishments
owned by parents in the South. Northern plants are on average twice as large in terms
of output than the Southern plants. The difference in size among most plants has widened
over the period, even though the difference among Japanese and Southern plants has
declined in Hong Kong and China.
I also make comparison with plant size measured in terms of total employment. The
cross-country comparisons are reported in Table 1.4. Northern plants in Hong Kong
and China are roughly a third larger than those in developing and transition countries.
However, the Japanese plants have become progressively smaller. In Singapore, the dif-
ference among plants is on average considerably larger than other countries with no signs
of decline over time. Ramstetter (1994) makes a similar comparison of manufacturing
MNC sizes (as measured by firm sales) in Thailand. He finds that MNCs from devel-
oped countries were much larger than those from developing and transition countries.
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However, there were a couple exceptions. Southern MNCs tended to be much larger in
industries associated with textiles and apparel, rubber and plastics, transport machinery,
and precision machinery and miscellaneous manufacturing.
One of the potential benefits of FDI for developing countries that is of particular interest
to policymakers is the extent to which these investments contribute to productivity gains.
Until now, most of the studies on productivity have focused on foreign-owned and local
plants. However, comparisons among investor origin have received scant attention. Takii
(2011) is among the few studies that provides a breakdown of labor productivity with
respect to investor origin. Table 1.5 reveals that plants representing North FDI have com-
paratively higher levels of labor productivity in Indonesia. The gap in labor productivity is
narrower in foods, textiles, and wood and furniture industries. These are industries where
South FDI is abundant. Table 1.6 reports differences in labor productivity, as measured by
real output per worker, among plants in Hong Kong, China, and Singapore. The plants
owned by investors in the North have higher productivity levels in Hong Kong, China,
and Singapore. The productivity margin has remained fairly constant over the period.
Ramstetter (1994) reports value-added per worker in manufacturing MNCs in Thai-
land. As shown in Table 1.6, the value-added per work for developed country MNCs is
roughly two-thirds the level of MNCs from developing and transition countries. The mar-
gins are particularly high in chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, metals and metal products,
nonelectric and electric machinery and computers, and motor vehicles. The margins are
much lower in foods, beverages and tobacco, wood and paper, and rubber and plastics.
Khalifah and Adam (2009) do not distinguish between investors by country origin but
include some hints as to productivity differences. They find that foreign-owned firms that
are capital-intensive select electronics or machinary industries, whereas labor-intensive
firms are concentrated in textiles and apparel. Considering that Southern MNCs lack pro-
prietary assets, they may invest in industries characterized by low wage and productivity.
Lipsey and Sjo¨holm (2011) make additional comparisons between North and South
FDI using Indonesian plant-level data. Table 1.7 reports firm-specific variables as ratios of
North to South. Northern plants are particularly large in high-productivity industries (e.g.,
paper products), whereas Southern plants are larger in low-productivity industries (e.g.,
basic metals). Northern plants tend to pay higher blue-collar wages than Southern plants.
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However, Southern plants tend to be more export-oriented. Table 1.8 shows the average
figures for individual countries from South. Southern plants from Hong Kong (SAR),
China, and the Republic of Korea are larger than plants from Malaysia and Singapore.
However, plants from Malaysia and Singapore have on average higher labor productivity
and export intensity than plants from other developing countries. White-collar wages are
on average higher in plants from Hong Kong (SAR), whereas blue-collar wages are on
average higher in plants from Hong Kong (SAR), Malaysia, and Singapore.
1.8 Conclusion
During the past two decades, developing economies have not only attracted more
investment, but also become big investors in their own right. According to UNCTAD,
about a third of global outward investment flows during 2014 came from developing
countries. This change underscores the structural shift taking place in the global economy.
The rise in South-South FDI provides new sources of finance and brings new opportuni-
ties for developing countries that have traditionally not been amongst the most favored
destinations for North FDI. The surge in South-South FDI stems from the rise in wealth
in some developing countries accompanied by market liberalization. South-South FDI has
remained acyclical in the face of global financial crisis. The bulk of South-South FDI is
intraregional in nature. Asia is the largest contributor to intraregional FDI. Moreover, a
sectoral breakdown shows that South-South FDI is mainly concentrated in the services
sector. However, it continues to grow in trade, business activities, construction, and ICT.
The nature of MNCs is also changing, with an increasing number of countries in de-
veloping countries hosting such firms. The existing OLI paradigm can explain only some
of the internationalization strategies of Southern MNCs. Southern MNCs lack propietary
assets when they internationalize in new conditions. In fact most Southern MNCs expand
overseas to build advantages and proprietary assets. They are able to catch up with
Northern MNCs through strategic and organizational innovations. The experience of op-
erating in difficult conditions at home has equipped Southern MNCs to cope with similar
conditions elsewhere. It gives them an organizational advantage when investing in other
countries with similar conditions and institutions. Southern MNCs are willing to take on
more risks and work in a poorer political climate. This strategy of internationalization
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is very different from the strategy that drove earlier MNC experiences involving export
expansion and trade promotion.
The plant characteristics of Southern MNCs are also very different. Bearing in mind
the data limitations, the plant size of Southern MNCs tends to be on average much smaller
than the plant size of Northern MNCs. However, the difference in size may vary substan-
tially by industry. Southern plants are also comparatively less productive than Northern
plants. The margins are higher when plant size is proxied by output per plant relative to
employment per plant. These productivity differences may stem from the lack of propre-
itary assets owned by Southern MNCs. They tend to have higher productivity in industries
characterized by low capital-labor ratios, such as food and beverages, tobacco, textiles and
apparel, and wood products. Moreover, wages tend to be lower in plants from the South.
However, they are more export-oriented than plants from the North.
For policy implications, I require a more robust analysis of South-South flows. It is
not too early to engage in open policy discussion on the following subjects: (a) What are
the location-specific determinants of South FDI? Is South FDI less risk-averse than North
FDI? (b) What types of product diversification strategies do Southern MNCs follow? Can
diversification undertaken by Northern MNCs be generalized to Southern MNCs? (c)
What is the extent of spillovers from South FDI and how these differ from spillovers from
North FDI? The answer to these questions can address some of the key issues regarding
South-South FDI. Since it is a relatively new phenomenon in both scope and magnitude,
further investigation will be necessary to refine our knowledge, in order to help develop-
ing countries, and particularly the poorest among them, realize the full benefits of the rise







































































































Figure 1.2. South’s outward FDI (% of total world)
Source: UNCTADstat (http://unctadstat.unctad.org)
Figure 1.3. Outward FDI stock by developing and transition regions, 1980-2004 (billions
of USD)
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Figure 1.4. Optimal modes of investment
Figure 1.5. Southern MNC’s ability to cope with imperfect institutions
Figure 1.6. Local partner’s ability to cope with imperfect institutions
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Table 1.1. Largest developing economy investors, 2014 (billions of USD)
Country Outward FDI stock Main destinations
Hong Kong (SAR) 1,459 China, United Kingdom, Australia,
Singapore, Canada
China 729 Hong Kong (SAR), United States,
Singapore, Australia, United
Kingdom
Brazil 316 Austria, United States,
Netherlands, Spain, Argentina
Republic of Korea 259 China, United States, Hong Kong
(SAR), Netherlands, Malaysia
Taiwan (SAR) 258 China, United Kingdom, Australia,
Singapore, Canada
Malaysia 135 Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia
United Kingdom, Hong Kong
(SAR)
South Africa 133 China, United Kingdom, United
States,
Mexico 131 United States, Netherlands, Brazil,
Spain, United Kingdom
India 129 Singapore, Mauritius, Netherlands,
United States, United Arab
Emirates




Table 1.2. Selected nonfinancial Southern MNCs operating in different industries by total
assets, 2014 (billions of USD)
Corporation Home economy Industry Total assets
CITIC Group China Diversified 762.8
Sinopec Group China Petroleum 359.1
Petrobras Brazil Petroleum refining 298.6
Samsung Electronics Co. Republic of Korea Electronics 209.6
Petronas Malaysia Petroleum 153.7
Hyundai Motor Republic of Korea Motor vehicles 133.9
Vale SA Brazil Mining and quarrying 116.6
Hutchison Whampoa
Limited
Hong Kong (SAR) Port logistics 113.9
SABIC Saudi Arabia Chemicals 90.6
SK Holdings Republic of Korea Petroleum refining 84.6
Hon Hai Precision
Industries
Taiwan (SAR) Electronics 77.9
Tata Group India Diversified 68.8




Cemex Mexico Cement 37.9
Kia Motors Republic of Korea Motor vehicles 37.3
Indian Oil India Petroleum refining 37.3
LG Electronics Republic of Korea Electronics 33.7
Orascom Egypt Diversified 19.8
DP World United Arab Emirates Port logistics 16.8
Source: Forbes Global 2000, Forbes
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Table 1.3. Output per planta in plants from South relative to plants from North in Hong
Kong (SAR) and Singapore
Location of plants 1983-1996 1983-1986 1987-1996
Hong Kong (SAR)
Plants from Southb relative to
Plants from
United States -52 -65 -45
Europec -51 -59 -48
Japan -24 -33 -22
Location of plants 1980-1994 1980-1986 1987-1994
Singapore
Plants from Southd relative to
Plants from
United States -92 -90 -92
Europec -83 -82 -84
Japan -73 -67 -76
a Real value added per plant.
b The PRC, Singapore, Taipei, China.
c Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK.
d Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, Thailand.
Source: Ramstetter (1999, Tables 6 and 7)
Table 1.4. Employment per planta in plants from South relative to plants from North in
Hong Kong (SAR) and Singapore
Location of plants 1983-1996 1983-1986 1987-1996
Hong Kong (SAR)
Plants from Southb relative to
Plants from
United States -48 -65 -37
Europec -45 -57 -40
Japan -10 -25 -4
Location of plants 1980-1994 1980-1986 1987-1994
Singapore
Plants from Southd relative to
Plants from
United States -79 -75 -81
Europec -53 -48 -56
Japan -62 -61 -63
a Employees per plant.
b The PRC, Singapore, Taipei, China.
c Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK.
d Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, Thailand.
Source: Ramstetter (1999, Tables 6 and 7)
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Table 1.5. Firms by sales size in manufacturing plants in Thailand




Food 12.2 42.0 13.8
Beverages, tobacco 0.0 14.1 0.2
Textiles, apparel, etc. 15.2 16.3 18.3
Wood, paper, printing 1.4 4.4 2.9
Chemicals 29.9 22.3 7.1
Rubber, plastics 7.1 4.9 7.8
Nonmetallic minerals 4.1 19.1 0.4
Metal, metal productions 27.3 8.4 5.9
Nonelectric machinery 15.2 1.6 0.6
Electronics 63.2 52.7 8.9
Transport machinery 79.9 0.2 1.1
Precision machinery 3.3 4.7 5.3
Source: Ramstetter (1994, Table 1)
Table 1.6. Productivity in plantsa from South relative to plants from North in Hong Kong
(SAR) and Singapore
Location of plants 1983-1996 1983-1986 1987-1996
Hong Kong (SAR)
Plants from Southb relative to
Plants from
United States -17 -6 -20
Europec -15 -4 -18
Japan -19 -9 -21
Location of plants 1980-1994 1980-1986 1987-1994
Singapore
Plants from Southd relative to
Plants from
United States -59 -59 -59
Europec -64 -65 -63
Japan -29 -18 -35
a Real value added per employee.
b The PRC, Singapore, Taipei, China.
c Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK.
d Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, Thailand.
Source: Ramstetter (1999, Tables 6 and 7)
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Table 1.7. Value-added per employee in manufacturing plants in Thailand




Food 251 382 289
Beverages, tobacco NA 295 1,266
Textiles, apparel, etc. 209 170 203
Wood, paper, printing 278 367 291
Chemicals 944 883 494
Rubber, plastics 470 331 458
Nonmetallic minerals 1,205 1,012 157
Metal, metal productions 777 1,002 386
Nonelectric machinery 760 338 180
Electronics 343 406 132
Transport machinery 1,859 168 111
Precision machinery 144 152 104
Source: Ramstetter (1994, Table 2)







Size 2.4 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.0
Productivity 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.8
Blue collar wages 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0
White collar wages 1.1 0.7 0.7 1.8 0.7
Export intensity 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7
Export share 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.2 1.8
Source: Plant-level data included in Lipsey and Sjo¨holm (2011)
CHAPTER 2
DOES LUCAS PARADOX APPLY TO FDI FROM
THE SOUTH?
2.1 Introduction
Decades have passed since Lucas (1990) asked why capital does not flow from rich
to poor countries, posing what is widely known as the Lucas paradox. According to the
standard neoclassical theory, Lucas paradox is often cited as a parsimonious explanation
for the scarcity of capital flows to developing countries (Lucas, 1990; Papaioannou, 2009).1
The explanations for this paradox range from asymmetric information (Portes & Rey, 2005)
to institutional weakness (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Volosovych, 2008). However, foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows into developing countries have increased substantially in
recent years. Least-developed countries registered a 14% increase in FDI in 2013. A large
share of the investment came from other developing countries. In terms of host, detailed
cross-border M&A and Greenfield data show that 60% of the outward flows from develop-
ing countries went into other developing and least-developed countries. The global South
accounts for 32% of global outward FDI in 2013, up from 16% in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2014).
Despite the growing importance of South-South FDI and increased desire of many de-
veloping countries to attract FDI from the South, the effect of host country’s determinants
on South-South FDI has received scant attention. Most of the studies have been done with
the focus on the traditional North-South flows. This chapter examines the application of
Lucas paradox on South-South FDI.2 Special attention is paid to the role of institutions and
asymmetric information in shaping FDI flows from the South. Using a panel data set on
1For more details, see King and Rebelo (1993), Razin and Yuen (1994), Gomme (1993), and Tornell and
Velasco (1992).
2It is important to note that Lucas discusses the paradox in the context of North-South flows. It is unclear
what the paradox is for South-South FDI. The purpose of this chapter is to test the different explanations that
come out of Lucas paradox for South-South FDI.
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bilateral FDI, I estimate an augmented gravity model using the Poisson psuedo likelihood
estimator.3 The gravity framework accounts for the Lucas paradox across countries and re-
duces the return differentials among countries. The data set covers 60 host countries from
the South; as well as 110 source countries, of which 30 are from the North. I attempt to shed
light on the question to what extent the alternative explanations of Lucas paradox holds
particularly for South-South FDI. The results reveal that per capita income, human capital,
and average institutional quality are not important variables explaining South-South FDI.
However, political stability and absence of violence is significantly related. South-South
FDI is also more sensitive to regional free trade agreements and natural resource endow-
ments.
This chapter is closely related to empirical work that examines the effect of institutions
on South-South foreign investment. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) shows that investors from
countries with higher levels of corruption select similar countries when they internation-
alize in order to exploit their previous experience of imperfect institutions. Buckley et
al. (2007) show that Chinese multinationals prefer countries with higher political risk,
even after controlling for the rate of return. Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013) find that
large institutional distance has a negative effect on FDI flows from the South. However,
this literature has neglected how FDI from the South responds to different aspects of
institutional quality. A large share of this literature tells us very little about specific reforms
that will impact FDI flows. This chapter aims to advance this literature by examining a
much wider range of indicators and understand their relative importance to South-South
and North-South FDI flows.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I review the literature.
Section 2.3 briefly lays out the conceptual framework. Section 2.4 describes the data and
provides descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 motivates my econometric approach. Section
2.6 reports the main econometric results and Section 2.7 concludes.
3Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argues that the most direct approach would be to compare the FDI’s rate of
return in different countries. However, the lack of internationally comparable measures of after-tax returns to
FDI flows makes this difficult.
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2.2 Literature review
Besides Lucas (1990), John Dunning’s (1981) ownership, localization, and internaliza-
tion (OLI) paradigm identifies ownership, internalization, and location advantages as the
main reasons why firms invest abroad. Among the factors that influence the decision of
a firm to invest in a foreign country, institutional quality is particularly valued, because
it guarantees the firm that it will earn its full return on investment (Aguiar et al., 2006;
Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2006; Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Egger & Winner, 2005). The early
theoretical papers were primarily concerned with the question of how FDI can be sustained
if there is a risk of expropriation in the absence of effective private property rights. The
seminal paper in this literature is Eaton and Gersovitz (1984), which shows that, among
other things, the mere existence of the threat of nationalization can distort international
capital flows. Foreign investors are sensitive to governance primarily due to the fear of
direct expropriation, such as nationalization of foreign investment projects. This also in-
cludes indirect expropriation, such as improper host government interference, restrictions
on the conversion and transfer of local-currency, or impairment of contracts.
Empirical analyses by Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998) and Busse and Hefeker
(2007) have shown that institutions enabling contract enforcement are critical to cross-
border FDI flows. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) employ various aspects of governance
structures, including measures of political instability, rule of law, regulatory burden, and
government effectiveness to explain FDI flows. The results indicate that the quality of insti-
tutional infrastructure is an important determinant of FDI inflows. Using a gravity model
approach, Stein and Daude (2002) show that institutional indicators are almost always
statistically significant and positive. The result is shown to be robust across different model
specifications and estimation techniques. Alfaro et al. (2008) identify misgovernance and
institutional weakness as principle factors that influence foreign investors. Multinationals
respond to improvement in institutional quality by increasing their investments. Other
papers study how institutions affect the firm’s investment strategy. The existence of weak
institutions may induce the firm to choose an outdated technology. Weak institutions may
cause underinvestment (Schnitzer, 1999) or excess capacity (Janeba, 2000). More recent
papers have analyzed the sale of shares to locals or joint ventures with local firms as
possible ways of mitigating political risk in the host country (Muller & Schnitzer, 2006).
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But most of the studies have been done with the focus on the traditional North-South
flows. In theory, Southern investors face disadvantages in terms of size, technology, and
management techniques relative to their Northern counterparts (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc,
2008). However, the ability of Southern investors to cope with imperfect institutions over-
comes Northern multinationals advantage in R&D and access to credit (Claessens & van
Horen, 2008; Dixit, 2012). Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) is one of the earliest empirical attempts
to examine the role of institutional quality in shaping capital flows between developing
countries. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) shows that investors from countries with higher levels
of corruption select similar countries when they internationalize in order to exploit their
previous experience of imperfect institutions. Buckley et al. (2007) show that Chinese
multinationals prefer countries with higher political risk, even after controlling for the
rate of return. More recently, Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013) have analyzed the im-
pact of institutional distance and natural resource endowment in South-South FDI. They
distinguish between positive and negative institutional distance if the host country has,
respectively, better or worse institutions than the origin country. They find that large
institutional distance has a negative effect on FDI flows and additionally point out that for
the case of resource-seeking FDI, poor institutions are not seen as a problem and they can
even be considered as an advantage to obtain special privileges over the natural resource.
2.3 Conceptual framework
Lucas paradox represents one of the major puzzles in international macroeconomics
and finance.4 The explanations of Lucas paradox range from asymmetric information
(Portes & Rey, 2005) to institutional weakness (Alfaro et al., 2008). However, the gravity
model employed in this chapter accounts for these explanations across countries and may
significantly reduce the return differentials among countries. Neverthless, I review the
standard neoclassical model and present the main empirical implications of Lucas para-
dox.
Consider a small open economy with a Cobb-Douglas production function where out-
4Lucas paradox is accompanied by the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: relatively high covariance between
savings and investment in OECD countries; the home-bias puzzle: lack of overseas investment by the home
country residents; and the risk sharing puzzle: relatively low correlation among consumption growth across
countries.
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put Y is produced using capital K and labor L
Yt = AtF(Kt, Lt) = AtKαt L
1−α
t FK(.) > 0, FL(.) > 0; FKK(.) < 0, FLL(.) < 0
where A denotes the total factor productivity (TFP). Providing that countries have a com-
mon technology, perfect capital mobility implies the instantaneous convergence of the
interest rates for country i and country j
At f ′(kit) = it = At f ′(k jt)
where f (.) is the net depreciation production function in per capita terms. The model
assumes there are diminishing marginal returns to capital, which implies that the resources
will flow to capital scarce countries. However, not enough capital seems to flow to capital
scarce countries and implied interest rates fail to converge. The explanations for this
paradox ranges from sovereign risk (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2004) and asymmetric information
(Portes & Rey, 2005) to institutional weakness (Alfaro et al., 2008).
Institutions represent a society’s rules of the game. Institutional quality affects for-
eign investment through its effect on property rights and risk of expropriation. Gener-
ally speaking, weak property rights as a result of poor institutions can lead to lack of
productive capacities.5 Weak institutions create a wedge between expected returns and
ex-post returns. These differences can be modeled in the parameter At. In addition to
TFP, At accounts for the differences in overall efficiency in the production across countries.
Although technology is available to all countries, weak institutions may be a barrier to
adoption of the existing technologies, or lead to differences in the efficient use of the same
technology (Rajan & Zingales, 2003).
Moreover, weak instititions may lead to domestic distortions associated with poor
macro- and microeconomic stability. Differences across countries in cost of doing business
(contract enforcement, permits, access to credit, etc.) can limit capital flows. Moreover,
inflation may work as a tax and decrease the return to capital. I model the effect of macro-
and microeconomic factors by introducing a government tax on capital at a rate τ, which
differs across countries. Thus, for country i and country j, the true return is
5It is likely that institutions may account for both weak production and capital market imperfections
since, historically, weak institutions might be responsible for historical and current sovereign risk and high
probability of default.
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At f ′(kit)(1− τit) = it = At f ′(k jt)(1− τjt)
Asymmetric information problems may also explain the scarcity of capital flows to
developing countries.6 Foreign investors tend to underinvest in countries where access
to accurate and timely local information is difficult (Gertler & Rogoff, 1990). Local infor-
mation might include information on supply lines, local financing, local tastes, the under-
ground economy, and other local idiosyncrasies. The access to this local information may
impact the investor’s cost of doing business or productivity. On the cost side, one might
argue that local knowledge allows the investor to produce more cheaply. Alternatively, if
local knowledge affects the marginal product of capital, then information is an input to
production.
The neoclassical theory also fails to account for omitted factors of production. For
example, higher accumulation of human capital is positively associated with returns to
capital. Less capital tends to flow to countries with lower levels of human capital. Hence,
the production function is given by





where Zt denotes the additional factor of production (e.g., human capital) that affects the
production process. Therefore, the true return for countries i and j is
At f ′(kit, zit) = it = At f ′(k jt, zjt)
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
2.4.1 Endogenous variable
The dependent variable is bilateral foreign direct investment from a source country s
to a host country d at a time t, as calculated in the balance of payments statistics. A foreign
firm requires a 10% or more of equity ownership to qualify as foreign direct investor.7 This
6Lucas discusses distortive government policies under capital market imperfections since he combines
domestic and international capital market imperfections. In the tradition of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), I
consider international capital market imperfections only those based on information asymmetries. I include
distortive government policies that affect capital’s productivity separatively.
7When a foreign investor purchases a local firm’s securities without exercising control over the firm, that
investment is regarded as a portfolio investment; direct investments include greenfield investments and equity
participation giving a controlling stake. The International Monetary Fund classifies an investment as direct if
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chapter uses a comprehensive data set of bilateral annual data on FDI inflows that cover
North-South and South-South investments. I construct a panel of host countries from the
South, in which all incoming FDI flows are aggregated into the North and South flows.
The data set covers 60 host countries from developing countries; as well as 110 source
countries, of which 30 are developed countries. The empirical work presented in the
following section is based on the most comprehensive available data on bilateral FDI flows.
The data for developed countries come from the “OECD International Direct Investment
Statistics Yearbook”, “OECD Foreign Direct Investment,” and Eurostat’s “New Cronos”
database. For developing and least-developed countries, I use bilateral FDI data from
national sources, World Bank, ASEAN, and the UNCTAD (for details, see Appendix B).
The data cover countries from Latin America, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and
African countries. Moreover, my chapter excludes inflows from islands and countries
identified as tax havens or offshore financial centers.
The sample period is between 2004 and 2013 and data frequency is annual, in line with
the availability of other variables. This leaves us with 17,280 country-pairs-years in the
bilateral data set. However, the data set contains about a 6% of zero-value observations.
As mentioned in the previous section, institutional weakness and asymmetric information
are often cited as the foremost explanations for the scarcity of capital flows to developing
countries. I analyze each of these independent variables in detail below.
2.4.2 Institutions
Despite having established itself as a ubiquitous concept in the international discourse,
the operationalization of institutions remains a difficult task. I operationalize institutions
based on a clear definition derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
project proposed in (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). The WGI rating system con-
sists of weighted variables measuring various dimensions of institutional challenges facing
firms in a country. Howell (2002) and Hoti, Chan, and McAleer (2002) provide a good
overview of major country risk rating agencies.
For this chapter, WGI rating system is the best choice for the following reasons. First,
a foreign investor holds at least 10% of a local firm’s equity while the remaining equity purchases are classified
under portfolio equity investment. We do not distinguish between minority and majority shareholders, as this
distinction is not important for my analysis.
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it covers various dimensions of institutional quality, proxied by courts, bureaucracy, and
the threat of political violence. Second, while many rating agencies provide information
on a selective sample of countries, the WGI covers nearly 140 countries. Finally, the WGI
rating system provides information for all years that are covered in my analysis. Each
institutional measure is normalized between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating good
institutional quality. The institutional measures include voice and accountability, political
stability and violence, government effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law, and
regulatory quality. To avoid multicollinearity, I rely on a simple average of these measures
to construct the average institutional quality variable.
I also use additional exogenous variables to capture macro- and microdistortions as-
sociated with government policies. Inflation volatility captures macroeconomic stability.8
The World Bank’s Doing Business indicators are used to capture microeconomic factors
affecting firms. They rank the difficulty, costs, and time it would take a firm to start
the business, deal with construction permits, register property, access credit, pay taxes,
import and export goods, enforce contracts, and complete the bankruptcy process. It also
measures the level of protection for investors. I take the simple average of each of the
seven ranks.9 Lower ranks indicate better, usually simpler regulations for businesses and
stronger protections of property rights.
2.4.3 Information asymmetry
Capital market imperfections are often caused by an asymmetry of information among
borrowers and lenders (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989). It is difficult to obtain accurate and
timely information about a country from abroad. This local information might include
information on supply lines, local financing, local tastes and preferences, bureaucratic
procedures, the underground economy, minimizing the costs of corruption, and other local
idiosyncrasies. Several authors consider this relationship in open economies. Gertler and
Rogoff (1990) show that capital market imperfections might cause a reversal in the direc-
8The capital controls measure is the average of four dummy variables: exchange arrangements, payments
restrictions on current transactions and on capital transactions, and repatriation requirements for export
proceeds. The measure is constructed using data collected by the IMF.
9More specifically, a country’s starting the business index is developed by taking the average of rankings on
the procedures, time, cost, and minimum capital requirements to register a business.
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tion of North-South capital flows. Capital market imperfections handicaps a firm’s ability
to choose the optimal level of capital investment, which may cause underinvestment or
excess capacity (Froot & Stein, 1991; Gordon & Bovenberg, 1996).
Bilateral distance in kilometers is often used as a proxy for the international capital
market failures, mainly asymmetric information. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that
fund managers earn abnormal returns in geographically proximate investments. Fund
managers are able to exploit informational advantages in their selection of nearby stocks.
Distance had a similar effect when analyzing the determinants of bilateral FDI (Portes &
Rey, 2005; Wei & Wu, 2002). Most studies use distance as a proxy measure for geographic
proximity. It is measured as the distance in thousands of kilometers from the capital city of
country i to the capital city of country j. However, I follow Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and
Yosha (2003) and Volosovych (2013) to construct an augmented distance variable based on
the weighted average of the distance in thousands of kilometers from the capital city of
country i to the capital city of country j using the per capita GDP shares of country j as a
weight. Denoting the distance from country i’s capital city to country j’s capital city by dij,





where GDPCjt is per capita GDP in country j at time t. GDPCW is sample-wide per capita
GDP at time t. I use Arcview software to obtain latitude and longitude of each capital city
and calculate the great arc distance between each pair.
The augmented distance variable can lead to some intriguing results. First, the variable
is different from “distance from equator” so it is not a direct measure for geographic
proximity. In my case, it aims to proxy the information frictions and remoteness. As an
example, consider two equally distant countries. The country which has a comparatively
smaller economy as a share of per capita GDP would display a higher value. For Congo,
average distance without the weights is approximately 6600 kilometers while augmented
distance with per capita GDP weights is approximately 9000 kilometers. For the US,
average distance without the weights is approximately 8700 kilometers while augmented
distance with weights is approximately 6400 kilometers. Moreover, sample-wide, the most




Estimating gravity equations is one of the most prominent empirical techniques to
analyze biltateral trade. The gravity equation rests on the assumptions that countries trade
in proportion to their respective GDPs and proximity.10 It is only recently that the gravity
equation has been applied to the empirical analysis of FDI flows (Braconier, Norba¨ck, &
Urban, 2005; Brainard, 1997; Egger & Pfaffermayr, 2004; Javorcik, O¨zden, Spatareanu, &
Neagu, 2011). This chapter estimates an augmented gravity model to explain bilateral
FDI. The model operates under the assumption that market size, distance, and factor en-
dowments determine the direction of bilateral FDI (Brainard, 1997; Helpman & Krugman,
1985).
There are two GDP-related core gravity variables. Host country’s GDP and source
country’s GDP capture size effects at a time t: the larger the market size of a host country
the more foreign investment it should receive; and similarly, the larger the source country
of FDI the more outward FDI from this country. The third core gravity variable is the
bilateral distance. As explained in the previous section, this chapter uses an augmented
distance variable that aims to proxy information frictions and remoteness. However, the
effect of the distance variable is likely to be nonlinear and to depend on cultural as well as
geographic distance. I therefore add contiguous borders, common language, and colonial
ties, as is common practice.
In addition to the core gravity variables, a wide variety of location factors is considered
in empirical studies on the determinants of FDI. GDP per capita of the host country mea-
sured in PPP is a measure of purchasing power and a measure of wage levels. I also include
human capital as an alternative explanation to Lucas paradox. Higher accumulation of
human capital is positively associated with returns to capital. Less FDI tends to flow to
countries with lower levels of human capital (Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 2001). The
descriptive statistics of control variables are provided in Table 2.1.
10A thorough treatment of the gravity equation can be found in Chapter 5 of Feenstra (2004) .
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2.5 Estimation strategy
2.5.1 Gravity model for FDI
As mentioned in the previous section, the basic gravity approach is frequently applied
to study the determinants of bilateral FDI flows. This model has become the most widely
used specification to study bilateral FDI flows (Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, & Naughton,
2007). For example, Wei (2000) relies on gravity equation to evaluate the influence of
corruption on outward FDI. The baseline equation relates the logarithm of outward FDI to
the logarithm of GDPs of the source and host countries and the logarithm of the distance
between them.
Head and Ries (2008) provide the theoretical microfoundations for a gravity model of
FDI. They develop a model of FDI with heterogeneous multinationals who want to control
existing foreign assets. Their model yields an equation identical to the gravity equation
used for bilateral trade. Recently, Kleinert and Toubal (2010) applied the gravity equation
to the analysis of FDI. I rely on Kleinert and Toubal (2010) specification to estimate the
many variations of the following gravity equation:11
ln(Yijt) = α1 + γ1 ln(GDPit) + γ2 ln(GDPjt) + γ3 ln(GDPCjt) + γ4 ln(H jt) +
γ5 (Dij) + γ6 Xij + γ7GOVijt + γ8 Cjt + γ9 IQLjt + ϕi + ϕj + δt + eijt
where the subscript t = 1, ..., T denotes the time period. Yijt is the bilateral FDI flow
from country i to country j in t; GDPit and GDPjt are the GDP of country i and country
j in t, respectively. GDPCjt is the GDP per capita of country j in t. Hjt is proxied by
average years of secondary, higher, and total schooling in the total population over 25
years old in country j at t. Information frictions and remoteness is captured by distance
Djt. Xij is a vector of other binary gravity variables (contiguity, common language, and
colonial ties). GOVjt is a vector that includes inflation volatility and ease of doing business,
capturing government policies. IQLjt is the average institutional quality. ϕi, ϕj, δt, and eijt
correspond to a source country time-invariant fixed effect, a host country time-invariant
fixed effect, a country invariant time effect, and the error term, respectively.
11The log-log specification was determined based on an appropriate Box-Cox test. I also estimate the model




Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that since estimated gravity equations do not
have a theoretical foundation, they suffer from omitted variables bias. Their theoretical
equation says that bilateral trade, after controlling for size, depends on bilateral trade
barriers between two countries relative to the product of their price indices which they
call multilateral resistance variables.
Since price indices are difficult to measure, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggest
replacing multilateral resistance term with country-specific dummies. However, the most
commonly used method includes source and host fixed-effects in order to control for the
specific country multilateral resistance term. The coefficient of the dummies for the source
and host should reflect the multilateral resistance of each country. R. Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006) develop a micro-founded gravity equation for panel data. They suggest that ignor-
ing multilateral resistance term seriously distorts the estimates of the gravity equations.
R. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) recommend using nation dummies and time-constant
pair dummies to resolve the so-called “gold-medal error”, i.e., the bias that results from
the omission of the multilateral resistance term (R. Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006). The grav-
ity model used in this study is inspired by these theoretically grounded gravity models,
especially by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and by R. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006).
2.5.3 Zero-value observations
A well-known problem of the log specification of the gravity equation is the difficulty
of accounting for zeros in the dependent variable, because dropping them could create
a selection bias. The exclusion of a subset of the data can affect the significance of the
test results and leads to biased conclusions. Therefore, the higher the number of zero-
value observations in the sample, the greater will be the selection bias and the higher the
likelihood of obtaining biased results.
My data set contains 6% of zero-value observations for bilateral foreign direct invest-
ment from a source country s to a host country d. Various methods have been implemented
in the empirical literature to overcome this problem. Some studies, such as Benassy-Quere,
Coupet, and Mayer (2007) for FDI stocks, replace the zeros with 1 or a small positive num-
ber. However, this is an ad-hoc method that can lead to biased coefficients if the equation
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is estimated using OLS (Go´mez-Herrera, 2013). Other empirical analyses estimate the
gravity equation using a Tobit model with a left censoring (censoring from below) limit
at zero. Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Wei (2000) apply a Tobit model to the estimation of
a gravity equation for FDI. However, this method is not appropriate for explaining why
some trade or investment flows are missing (Linders & de Groot, 2006).
In the present study I use Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PPML) as
a way to avoid dropping the zero value observations. Even though Poisson is more com-
monly used as an estimator for count data models, it is appropriate to apply it far more
generally to non-linear models, such as the gravity equation (Santos Silva & Tenreyro,
2006; Westerlund & Whilhelmson, 2011). Poisson model allows to estimate the gravity
equation in its multiplicative form without taking the log-linear transformation. Unlike
the Tobit model, it is possible in a Poisson model to retain the fixed effects and provides




Table 2.2 presents the baseline regression. Model (1) presents the regression results
and the test statistics using the OLS estimator. Model (2) repeats the same exercise using
the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PPML). Notice that all specifications
include time invariant country and year fixed effects. The overall fit of the regression
is reasonable, especially considering the heterogeneous set of countries included in the
analysis.
Although the significance level of some of the standard variables is sensitive to the
specification used, it is reassuring to note that they have the expected signs in PPML. I
find that the size of the host market, proxied by its GDP, strongly increases bilateral FDI.
Contiguity, common language, and colonial past also significantly affect bilateral FDI. The
distance variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. These results are in line with
previous works using the identical specification, such as (Head & Ries, 2008). Average
institutional quality is positive and highly significant. The result indicates that countries
with strong institutions received more foreign investment over the sample period. The
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results for human capital vary according to the estimator used. Human capital is positive
but not significant in the OLS estimator. However, the coefficient becomes significant at
the 10% level once I include the zero-value observations and control for selection bias.
Inflation volatility has the expected sign but is not significant, whereas the cost of doing
business is positive and significant at the 5% level.
Models (3) and (4) present the main results by estimating the North-South and South-
South FDI separately. The determinants of FDI differ widely according to the host country
category. Per capita income is positive and significantly related to North-South FDI, which
indicates a preference for countries with higher capital-labor ratios. However, per capita
income is not an important variable explaining South-South FDI. The results also demon-
strate that the average institutional quality is highly significant for North-South FDI. Av-
erage institutional quality is only significant at the 10% level for South-South FDI. Human
capital also appears to be a significant factor for investors from the North. Information
friction as proxied by the distance variable is highly significant for both North-South and
South-South FDI. Put differently, investors underinvest in markets that are remote and
where access to local information may be difficult. Macroeconomic stability, proxied by
inflation volatility, has the expected sign, though it is insignificant for both North-South
and South-South FDI. Nevertheless, North-South FDI is sensitive to the cost of doing
business, reflecting the importance of local microeconomic factors. Market size as proxied
by the host country’s GDP is significant for both models. Among the traditional gravity
variables, nearly all the variables are significantly related to South-South flows, whereas
only colonial ties and and common language are significantly related to North-South flows.
However, it is possible that China may be driving the results. China constitutes a fairly
large share of North-South and South-South flows. Moreover, as noted by Chapter 1, there
has long been an issue of ’round-tripping’ of investment in China. Preferential treatment
offered to foreign investors in China motivates local firms to move money offshore and
then bring it back to China disguised as FDI. Models (5) and (6) exclude China to account
for the potential biases. As seen in Table 2.2, average institutional quality remains robust
to the exclusion of China.
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 show which components of the average institutional quality
are driving the results. To avoid multicollinearity, the institutional quality components are
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added one by one. Voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence,
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality are shown from models (1) to (8). Other
components such as control of corruption and rule of law are insignificant and thus I do
not report the results. The results reveal that Southern investors perceive government
accountability and regulatory quality as less of a concern than their Northern counterparts.
However, political stability turns out to be highly significant, which indicates that political
violence and conflict abroad is an important determinant of FDI from the South. The ex-
planation for this may rest on the perception that political instability cannot be effectively
mitigated (World investment and political risk, 2009). Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 disaggregate
the cost of doing business components. The components enter the specification as distinct
variables. The results show that access to credit and ease of trading across borders are
significantly associated with FDI from the North. Trading across borders is also signif-
icantly related to South-South FDI. The explanation for this may rest on the traditional
proximity-concentration literature. A multinational may rely on intermediate goods which
are imported from elsewhere. It may also cater to markets outside the host country. Thus,
foreign investors might be attentive to the cost of trading across borders.
2.6.1.2 Role of natural resource endowments and RTAs
One of the primary motivations for overseas investments according to the eclectic
paradigm is resource-seeking (Dunning, 1981). According to UNCTAD (2007), Southern
investors have increasingly pursued foreign exploration projects owing to an increased
demand and soaring prices of natural resources. Resource-seeking FDI is likely to ignore
high investment barriers as long as they do not prevent the firm from acquiring domes-
tic resources. According to Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013), resource-seeking FDI is
influenced by considerations other than institutional quality.
A different factor aimed at reducing the investor’s risk of investing abroad is a regional
free trade agreement (RTA). The last two decades have seen a surge in RTAs. According to
WTO estimates, 406 RTAs were in effect worldwide in 2015 compared with only 19 in 1989.
Most of this growth is driven by the South-South RTAs. RTAs can affect the incentives for
FDI in multiple ways (Blomstro¨m & Kokko, 1997; Jaumotte, 2004).12 They can harmonize
12Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are defined as reciprocal trade agreements between two or more
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regulatory and institutional frameworks. Coe, Kelly, and Yeung (2007) note that RTAs
often comprise commitments to domestic reforms that create a more conducive political
and investment climate for multinationals to invest, thereby reducing institutional risk.
Thangavelu and Findlay (2011) show a positive effect of multilateral trade agreements and
FDI inflows into the Asia-Pacific region. Mercosur trading bloc has also led to substantial
FDI inflows into the Latin American region (O¨zden & Parodi, 2004; Yeyati, Stein, & Daude,
2004).
To capture the impact of natural resources, I add a variable of natural resource endow-
ment of the host country, proximated by the subsoil resources in USD dollars per capita in
the host country. RTA is captured by a dummy variable that includes free trade agreements
and custom unions, regardless of whether they are bilateral, subregional, or regional in
nature. The results in Table 2.7 reveal that both RTA and natural resource endowment
have a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI flows from the South, whereas
the variables are insignificant for North-South FDI. They show that natural resources may
not be a significant motivation for North-South FDI. With respect to RTA, the result is not
entirely unexpected. South-South RTAs appear to have a much wider scope and coverage
than its counterpart. They not only include tariff concessions but also address nontrade
measures, such as investment, government procurement, and labor mobility (UNCTAD,
2008).
2.6.2 Robustness checks
So far, there has been no discussion of the endogeneity bias. FDI inflows and aver-
age institutional quality might be determined by an omitted third factor. It is possible
that capital account liberalization might be a variable driving the results. In order to see
if this is the case, I construct an index of capital controls. The index is a mean value
of four variables that include exchange arrangements, payments restrictions for current
transactions, payment restrictions for capital transactions, and repatriation requirements
for export proceeds. Capital controls may deter FDI (Asiedu & Esfahani, 2001). They
partners. They include free trade agreements and customs unions. Detailed information on RTAs is available
at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/region e.htm
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increase the costs associated with capital movements and associated transactions.13 As
seen in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9, capital controls are negatively signed but not significant
at the 5% level. Upon the addition of capital controls, the average institutional quality
remains positive and significant. Another variable that might be an important factor is
trade. A trade openness variable is constructed based on the sum of exports and imports
as a share of output. Trade openness can positively influence the export-oriented FDI
flows (UNCTAD, 2009). As shown in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9, average institutional quality
is robust to the inclusion of trade openness. Trade openness is positive and significant
for FDI from the North. I also try standard measure of tax burden. If a country’s tax
burden is high relative to other countries, foreign investors may shift to countries with
a less burdensome tax regime. Total tax rates have a significant and negative effect on
FDI flows from the North. However, average institutional quality measure remains robust
to its inclusion. I also include financial market development as potential drivers of FDI
flows. Nasser and Gomez (2009) note that financial development affects the cost structure
of investment projects. It provides better business opportunities for firms. Inclusion of this
measure did not change the overall picture.
Reverse causation can also be a source of endogeneity. It is possible that bilateral FDI
inflows affect the institutional quality of a country. More FDI inflows can strengthen in-
stitutional capacity in the host country through improved regulation and investor friendly
environment. Following Alfaro et al. (2008), I employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
regression to include instruments that could explain the institutional variation. I use legal
origin as an instrument of average institutional quality. According to La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), a country’s legal origin has a significant effect on
its average institutional quality. For example, English common law offers stronger legal
protection to investors than its counterparts. However, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001) disregard legal origin as a way to explain the average institutional quality. The
European settlers set up worse institutions in places where they faced a difficult disease
environment. They propose historical mortality rates of European settlers as an instrument
13Foreign investors may be able to overcome these problems through other channels such as transfer pricing.
Thus, capital controls may be favored if the stabilization effect helps in reducing the occurrence of financial
crisis.
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of average institutional quality. The data on European settlers mortality rates come from
Acemoglu et al. (2001). However, these rates are not available for the whole sample. Thus,
my sample is reduced to 41 countries from the South.
Table 2.10 presents the first stage results in Panel A. As shown in model (1), I choose
legal origin as an instrument of average institutional quality. Panel B presents the second
stage results. There is a strong relationship between legal origin and average institutional
quality. The F-statistic of legal origin is 12.42. In model (2), I choose European settler
mortality rates as an instrument of average institutional quality. As shown in Panel B,
average institutional quality remains significant. The F-statistic is 15.75. Model (3) reports
the results using both settler mortality and legal origin as instruments for average institu-
tional quality. This approach provides a stronger first stage fit. The p-value of 0.41 of the
Sargan-Hansen J-test indicates instrument validity. The second stage coefficient on average
institutional quality is statistically significant at the 1% level. The results demonstrate
that the historically predetermined measure of institutional quality has a positive and
significant impact on FDI.
2.7 Conclusion
Lucas paradox has provided a parsimonious explanation for the scarcity of capital
flows to developing countries. The explanations range from human capital to institutional
weakness. However, the gravity model accounts for the differences across countries which
may eliminate the return differentials among countries. The chapter examines some of
the explanations of Lucas paradox using a bilateral panel data set of North-South and
South-South FDI flows. The chapter relies on the gravity model that accounts for the Lucas
paradox across countries which may eliminate the return differentials among countries.
Everything else equal, the empirical evidence suggests that per capita income, human
capital, and average institutional quality are not important variables explaining South-
South FDI. However, political stability and absence of violence is a significant determinant
of FDI from the South. The explanation for this may rest on the perception that political
instability risks cannot be effectively mitigated. Moreover, information friction as proxied
by the distance variable and most gravity variables are highly significant. Like Northern
investors, Southern investors underinvest in markets that are remote and where access
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to local information is difficult. Among the government policy variables, average cost
of doing business variable is not a significant determinant of South-South FDI, whereas
North-South FDI is significantly related to average cost of doing business. Macroeconomic
instability, as proxied by inflation volatility, is not significant in any of the models. Finally,
South-South FDI is substantially more sensitive to natural resource endowments and re-
gional free trade agreements than North-South FDI.
To address the endogeneity problem, I undertake extensive robustness analysis. First,
extra control variables are added to account for specification bias. Total tax rate and
trade openness has a significant affect on FDI from the North, whereas only trade open-
ness is significantly related to South-South FDI. Nevertheless, average institutional quality
remains robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. Second, I estimate in-
strumental variable two-stage least squares models to address reverse causality between
institutional quality and FDI. The model employs legal origin and settler mortality rates as
historically predetermined proxies of institutional quality. The IV estimates suggest that
historically predetermined institutional quality has a significant impact on FDI.
Institutional quality and human capital remain an important source for traditional
North-South flows. However, the affects disappear once I observe the South-South flows.
Moreover, reduction in trade barriers positively affects FDI from the South. From a policy
perspective, since building up secure property rights and institutions is slow and costly
for developing countries, ensuring political stability and absence of violence can provide
an avenue to attract FDI from the South. However, FDI does not directly imply higher
economic growth. 14 For many countries, reaping the advantages that may accrue from
Southern FDI may be more challenging than Northern FDI. In particular, Southern FDI
appears to be neutral to low levels of institution building and accumulation of human
capital. It may reinforce the low-equilibria trap found in many developing countries. The
results call for more research on host country effects of FDI from the South. Understanding
the role of Southern FDI in employment and labor productivity may be a good channel to
evaluate the real potential of such FDI as an essential engine of growth in developing
countries.
14See Durham (2000) and De Gregorio (2003) for a review of literature on the effect of FDI on growth.
46
Source: Author’s construction
Figure 2.1. The share of FDI inflows in GDP in developing and transition economies
(2004-2013)
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Log of bilateral FDI (North-South) 14.62 4.83 4.17 27.53
Log of bilateral FDI (South-South) 8.20 5.51 2.96 20.81
ln(GDPit) 10.08 1.76 2.10 15.67
ln(GDPjt) 6.27 1.46 1.87 8.78
ln(GDPCjt) 3.71 0.73 1.71 4.44
Human capital (Hjt) 5.61 2.82 0.46 11.51
Log of distance (ln Dij) 9.08 1.10 4.82 10.67
Contiguity 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
Common Language 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Colonial ties 0.07 0.24 0.00 1.00
Log of inflation volatility 4.72 6.01 0.69 7.68
Log of average institutional quality
(ln IQLjt)
2.37 1.59 3.77 4.52
Notes: The bilateral sample is composed of 110 countries for which all the main explanatory variables are
available. Average institutional quality includes all the rating components from International Country Risk
Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components are voice and accountability, political
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of
corruption. The index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Years of schooling is years
of total schooling in total population over the age of 26. Distance is constructed as the weighted average
of the distances in thousands of kms from the capital city of the particular country to the capital cities of
the other countries, using the total per capita GDP shares of the other countries as weights. Average cost of
doing business includes the difficulty, costs, and time it would take a firm to start the business, deal with
construction permits, register property, access credit, pay taxes, import and export goods, enforce contracts,
and complete the bankruptcy process, averaged over the relevant sample period. See Appendices A and B for
detailed explanations of all the variables and sources.
48
Table 2.2. Main results using OLS and Poisson PML, 2004-2013
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17295 18280 6184 12096 5992 10090
R-squared 0.63 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.68
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been
tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level;
* significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.3. Disaggregated institutional quality for North-South, 2004-2013
Dependent variable is annual bilateral FDI inflows (Yijt)
North-South
ACCT POLS GOVT REG





































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6184 6184 6184 6184
R-squared 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.63
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been
tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level;
* significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.4. Disaggregated institutional quality for South-South, 2004-2013
Dependent variable is annual bilateral FDI inflows (Yijt)
South-South
ACCT POLS GOVT REG





































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12096 12096 12096 12096
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been
tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level;
* significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.5. Disaggregated ease of doing business for North-South, 2004-2013
Dependent variable is annual bilateral FDI inflows (Yijt)
North-South































































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6184 6184 6184 6184 6184
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.67
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been
tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level;
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.6. Disaggregated ease of doing business for South-South, 2004-2013
Dependent variable is annual bilateral FDI inflows (Yijt)
South-South































































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12096 12096 12096 12096 12096
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.68
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been
tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level;
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.7. Natural resource and RTAs, 2004-2013
Dependent variable is annual bilateral FDI inflows (Yijt)
North-South South-South

































































































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6184 6184 6184 12096 12096 12096
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.68
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been
tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level;
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.8. Robustness I: Additional control variables for North-South
Dependent variable is annual bilateral FDI inflows (Yijt)
North-South





















































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 6184 6184 5858
R-squared 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been
tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level;
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.9. Robustness I: Additional control variables for South-South
Dependent variable is annual bilateral FDI inflows (Yijt)
South-South





















































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11381 12096 12096 11770
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been
tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level;
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.10. Robustness II: Two-stage least squares
Panel A
First stage regression (1) (2) (3)






















Countries 41 41 41
Sargan-Hansen J-test 0.41
Notes: The table reports instrumental variable estimates. Panel A reports second stage estimates of two stage
least squares estimates. The dependent variable is the bilateral FDI from country i to country j. Panel B reports





Foreign direct investment outflow from developing countries has increased substan-
tially in recent years. South-South FDI has stayed strong even as traditional North-South
FDI has been volatile amidst the global slowdown. The surge in South-South FDI has
motivated developing countries to embark upon a series of policies aimed at attracting
South FDI. Some of these policies aim to fast track new investments and equalize operating
conditions for foreign capital. Other policies provide monetary incentives for foreign
investors, including special and preferential treatment in taxation and lax environmental
regulations, whereas policies that level the playing field for foreign firms operating in a
country are prerequisites for FDI seeking higher yields; the policies that subsidize foreign
investors through tax incentives and lenient regulations may be justified only if these
investments raise productivity and contribute to spillovers in the local economy.
The existing literature covers several channels through which foreign ownership leads
to productivity gains. First, foreign affiliates are more efficient than their domestic coun-
terparts. They have greater operational advantages and assets that lead to higher pro-
ductivity (Arnold & Javorcik, 2009; E., Sjo¨holm, & Sun, 2010; Markusen, 2004). Second,
foreign affiliates may produce positive externalities benefiting local firms through training
local employees hired next by local firms, thus enhancing technology imitation or simply
through backward or forward linkages. Third, potential increases in local competition
following the entry of foreign affiliates may also be considered as externalities contributing
to productivity spillovers. That said, the entry of foreign affiliates may also adversely affect
the productivity of local firms by disturbing the existing market equilibrium. It may erode
the market power of local firms, thereby reducing their productivity. Despite this, foreign
58
ownership is shown to have a positive effect on productivity.
Until now, most of the studies on productivity of FDI have focused on traditional
North-South flows. However, as more Southern investors internationalize, policymakers
must grapple with this subject. South FDI is different from the traditional North FDI. It
defies the traditional neoclassical framework that applies to North FDI. South FDI faces
disadvantages in terms of size and advanced technology (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008).
However, the informational advantage of South FDI may overcome North FDI’s advantage
in proprietary assets (Dixit, 2012). Little empirical evidence on the relationship between
South FDI and productivity in developing countries exists. Given the rapid expansion of
South FDI, this chapter attempts to fill this void.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contribution of FDI in enhancing effi-
ciency in Rwanda, testing first the hypothesis that North and South FDI cause different
productivity shifts.1 Then, productivity spillovers are analyzed and their relationship to
North and South FDI is also explored. In addition to the usual productivity determinants,
the consequences of other explanatory variables on the productivity of firms are also taken
into account. The chapter focuses on Rwanda because it is among the world’s poorest
nations and faces particular challenges in leveraging FDI for development. It has low
levels of human capital accumulation, a history of political instability, and is landlocked
and small in size. However, in recent years, Rwanda has embarked upon stabilization
policies and a series of structural reforms aimed at attracting inward FDI. The inward FDI
in Rwanda to date has increased more than threefold. Moreover, a large share of inward
FDI has come from other developing countries.
As a benchmark, the empirical model is estimated using the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimator. However, the distribution of productivity is analyzed and is found to
be skewed with a long right tail. Formal testing leads to a rejection of the usual as-
sumption of normality of labor productivity. In this case, OLS would yield estimates
not representative of the entire firm distribution. For this reason, the quantile regression
technique is employed. By estimating quantile regressions, I am able first to test for
1The definition of FDI is as proposed in Balance of Payments Manual: Fifth Edition (BPM5) by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). A firm requires a 10% or more of equity ownership from a foreign investor
to qualify as foreign-owned.
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differences in productivity by North and South FDI at various quantiles and second, I take
into account any possible bias due to long tails and unoberseved heterogeneity among
firms. The estimates produced by quantile regressions are considered robust as opposed
to the estimates produced by OLS.
My empirical findings are based on a sample of 6,707 private sector firms producing
in Rwanda in 2014. The plant-level data are collected through the Rwanda Establishment
Census 2014. While the data set lacks time dimension, it contains very rich information
on many aspects of firm’s state and behavior. The findings contribute to the literature
in two major ways. First, productivity in Rwanda is improved with the entry of both
North and South FDI, although the coefficient estimate of North FDI is stronger than that
of South FDI. Second, the productivity spillovers stemming from South FDI are limited
to low-productivity local firms, whereas the presence of North FDI causes productivity
spillovers across the productivity conditional distribution. These spillovers suggest that
policy recommendations with respect to attracting FDI cannot be generalized. The recom-
mendations should take into account the policy objectives of an economy as well as the
firm productivity distribution involved.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of the
previous literature. Section 3.3 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Sec-
tion 3.4 motivates my econometrics approach. Section 3.5 reports the main econometrics
results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
With a population expected to roughly double by 2050 and a gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate of more than 5% a year, Africa is the world’s second-fastest developing
continent. However, Africa faces the challenge of creating enough jobs to support its
growing working-age population—especially the increasing number of young people. The
pace of job creation must accelerate to keep up with the number of people who need
employment and to maintain high levels of economic growth. Until now, only a few
African workers have found work in the formal sector. Most find themselves trapped in the
informal economy, characterized by low wages and productivity. FDI can play a catalyst
role in productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Within the past decade, sub-Saharan
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African countries have made significant strides in attracting FDI from the South. However,
the contribution to productivity of FDI from the South remains moot.
The presence of foreign affiliates affect productivity in several ways. Foreign affiliates
are inherently disadvantaged relative to local firms. They have less knowledge of local
markets and practices. However, they are able to overcome their informational disadvan-
tage by possesing firm-specific advantages in the form of proprietary assets such as tech-
nology and management, and knowledge-capital (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). These
proprietary assets act as a joint input across affiliates and give rise to scale economies at the
firm level (Markusen, 2004). Local firms may also benefit from the productivity spillovers.
Productivity spillovers occur when the entry of foreign affiliates leads to efficiency or
productivity benefits for local firms (Blomstro¨m & Kokko, 1998). Local firms may be able
to improve their productivity by hiring workers trained at foreign affiliates. Proprietary
assets may be observed and imitated. However, the entry of foreign affiliates into a market
may also reduce the productivity of local firms through a market-stealing effect, causing
them to cut production, hence increasing their average cost (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, &
Kortum, 2003). On the other hand, local firms can benefit from having backward and
forward linkages with foreign firms (Crespo & Fontoura, 2007).
The first strand of literature exploring whether foreign investment results in benefi-
cial effects focuses on macroeconomic factors and cross-country analyses using aggregate
data. Another strand focuses on productivity effects at the firm level. For the purpose of
this chapter, I focus on the latter since increases in firm productivity feed into aggregate
productivity (Syverson, 2011). Lipsey (2004) maintains that although the foreign owned
firms are more productive and pay higher average wages, their spillover effect on local
firms is much less clear. Go¨rg and Greenaway (2004) show that the evidence on foreign
ownership and productivity remains moot. It varies based on the study methodology
and data employed. Nevertheless, several empirical studies examine the effect of foreign
ownership on firm productivity in developing and developed countries.
I will begin by reviewing the evidence at the macro level. Using a cross-country panel
data set, Nourzad (2008) shows that increased FDI is positively related to potential output
in both developing and developed countries. However, this effect is more pronounced
in developed than in developing countries. Fillat and Woerz (2011) examine the effect of
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foreign ownership on productivity at the industry and country levels. They find that FDI
is positively related to productivity in industries characterized by export orientation and
high capital investments. More recently, Waldkirch (2014) has observed the relationship
between foreign presence and productivity across 118 countries. Waldkirch’s results show
that foreign firms are more productive than local firms in developing countries.
The study by Blomstro¨m and Wolff (1994) is among the earliest attempts to consider
the relationship between foreign ownership and productivity at the firm level. They esti-
mate the impact of industry foreign participation on labor productivity growth of Mexican
manufacturing firms. The results show that foreign firms generate positive externalities
and labor productivity growth is positively associated with foreign participation. Aitken
and Harrison (1999) investigate whether foreign equity participation in Venezuela leads to
greater firm productivity. They find some evidence that even though foreign ownership
is positively correlated with establishment productivity, it negatively affects the produc-
tivity of domestically owned establishments. Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm (1999) find some
evidence that foreign-owned firms have comparatively higher levels of labor productivity.
However, export-oriented local firms do not benefit from FDI spillovers, whereas firms
that service only the local market do benefit from foreign presence.
Jordaan (2005, 2008) uses data from the 1993 Industrial Census to examine positive
externalities from FDI on labor productivity of local establishments. He finds that foreign
ownership has a significant and positive effect on labor productivity. The effect is more
common in industries where foreign investors tend to crowd in. Arnold and Javorcik
(2009) provide a comprehensive study of a wide range of firm-level outcomes, including
productivity growth. They find that local firms acquired by foreign investors in Indonesia
experiences greater productivity growth than domestic firms. The restructuring at firm
following acquisition raises investment, employment, and wages. Liu (2008) investigates
Chinese firms to provide evidence that foreign presence is negatively related to productiv-
ity levels. However, Waldkirch and Ofosu (2010) find that foreign presence has a positive
effect on productivity levels at manufacturing firms in Ghana.
I now turn to a brief discussion of the data and descriptive statistics.
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3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
Data are drawn at the establishment-level collected through the Rwanda Establishment
Census 2014. The census provides a profile of all establishments in the country excluding
governmental establishments providing not-for-sale governmental services. The question-
naire covers extensive information on domestic and foreign establishments. The main
objective of the census is to provide a comprehensive profile of all economic activities prac-
ticed by establishments in Rwanda. The characteristics considered are economic activity,
ownership, registration of establishment, capital employed, labor employed, taxation, and
payment status. The data collection covered all 40 districts and was conducted during a
period of 26 days from 24th November to 24th December in 2014.
In my analysis, I consider the sample of private sector establishments registered with
the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) along the dimensions of size (1-3, 4-30, 31-100 or
100+ employees), ownership (domestic or foreign), and sector (ISIC Rev. 3.1 2-digit level).2
Nearly 90% of the sample is comprised of single-unit establishments.3 The sample has
6,651 establishments, of which 476 (7.16%) are foreign affiliates. Of 476 foreign affiliates,
211 are North-owned and 265 are South-owned.4 The services sector accounts for the
largest share of enterprises, followed by manufacturing. The capital and largest city in
Rwanda, Kigali, has the highest concentration of firms. More than half the firms are small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) employing between 4 to 100 employees. The total number
of workforce employed is 157,827, of which 57,291 are females. Most of the workforce is
concentrated in wholesale and retail activities, education, and manufacturing.
The available establishment-level variables include the level of employment, firm age,
value of firm sales, labor productivity, capital-labor ratio, share of female in total employ-
ment, and share of foreign in total employment. The ownership variable takes the value 1
if the firm is a foreign affiliate and 0 otherwise. Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics
2An establishment is defined as the smallest unit with proper equipment and personnel to produce goods
or services.
3The questionnaires were only distributed to single-unit enterprise or a head office of a multi-unit estab-
lishment. For a multi-unit establishment, a head office had to fill in questionnaires for brance offices.
4Following much of the existing literature a firm is defined as foreign-owned if 10% or more of its equity is
held by foreign nationals.
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of firms by ownership and economic sector. Due to differences in firm size and economic
activity, some of the variables have a large standard deviation. The table indicates that
in the majority of cases the mean value is larger for foreign affiliates. Foreign affiliates
are more capital-intensive and have higher productivity levels than local firms. They also
have a greater share of foreign employees, whereas local firms have greater value of sales
and female employees than their domestic counterparts.
Lastly, the use of this data set brings with it certain advantages and limitations. The
main advantage is that the data are representative for the entire sample of enterprises
in Rwanda. Also, the only other census data previously made available are for 2011.
However, the present census includes a much wider set of variables, which speaks to its
uniqueness. The disadvantages must also be noted. The census data do not provide a
matched employer-employee database, which means that my analysis is not able to control
for workforce heterogeneity at the individual level. It is also a single cross-section with
no time-series variation. Thus, I am unable to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity
through the use of firm fixed effects.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Main model
The hypothesis I seek to test in this chapter can be formulated within a neoclassical
production theory framework. Assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
Q = AKαL1−α (3.1)
where Q, K, and L are production, capital, and labor, respectively. A is the efficiency
parameter.
Production can be stated as a function of the capital–labor ratio k = (K/L):
Q = A (K/L)α L = AkαL (3.2)
Dividing both sides by L gives the physical product of labor y = (Q/L):
yij = Akα (3.3)
Finally, stating Eq. (3.3) in log-linear form and adopting its intensive form, I obtain:
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ln yijk = α0 + α1 ln kijk + eijk (3.4)
The equation states that the estimated labor productivity yijk of the ith firm in sector j in
district k is a function of the capital-labor ratio kijk and where eijk is a random disturbance
term. kijk is the capital-labor ratio as measured by the firm’s total capital over total em-
ployment.
To allow for differences in productivity between domestic and foreign firms, a dummy
variable f oreign may be introduced in Eq. (3.4). The variable may take the value 1 if
the firm is foreign-owned and 0 otherwise. According to the theory, Northern investors
possess superior proprietary assets, whereas Southern investors have informational ad-
vantages. Therefore, differences in investor origin may cause different shifts in the level of
productivity. To test this assertion, two separate dummy variables, South and North, tak-
ing the value of 1 if the foreign firm is Southern-owned or Northern-owned, respectively,
may replace f oreign.
Another problem that may arise is the existence of heterogeneity across firms. There
are several sources of heterogeneity, some of which are taken into account by allowing
some of the factors that determine them to enter explicitly the regression equation and be
treated as exogenous shocks. The literature suggests the use of firm-specific information
concerning the firm. Thus, a group of firm-specific variables, Xijk = value of firm sales,
firm size, firm age in years, female employment share, and foreign employment share for
the ith firm is introduced. Firm size is measured by the level of employment. Firm sales,
age, and size as measured are expected to increase productivity, as large sized and more
established firms may be more efficient (J. Baldwin, 1996).
The two labor market variables are female employment share and foreign employment
share. Female employment share is greater in firms that are more labor intensive, in
which case it may reduce productivity. However, the sign on the foreign employment
share is ambiguous a priori. The effect of foreign employment share likely depends on
the sector. Labor-intensive, low-technology industries such as textiles and apparel or food
processing may employ a greater share of foreign workers in order to exploit labor cost
advantages. However, a greater share of foreign workers in capital-intensive sectors may
reflect a higher degree of human capital (Foster-McGregor, Isaksson, & Kaulich, 2015).
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By treating explicitly the Xijk variables in the regression equation, problems of hetero-
geneity bias and possible collinearity with the error term from the omission of statistically
significant regressors are mitigated. Thus, an augmented form of the production function
is specified as:
ln yijk = α0 + α1 ln kijk +∑ α2j ln Xijk + α3 f oreign + ϕjk + eijk (3.5)
where ϕjk are industry-district fixed-effects and eijk is the error term.
3.4.2 Estimation issues
3.4.2.1 Endogeneity of FDI
Potential endogeneity is a prominent source of bias in the cross-section establishment-
level analysis. In particular, the endogeneity problem related to the variable of interest
f oreign is a concern. Suppose that foreign investors select industries and districts that
are a priori more productive and benefit from agglomeration economies, which may bias
the productivity and lead to an upward bias in the foreign ownership premium. FDI in
Rwanda is concentrated in capital-intensive industries. Manufacturing accounts for the
third largest share of total FDI, after ICT and finance. For this reason, I introduce a sector
fixed-effects to control for potential endogeneity problem related to foreign ownership.
Note that the panel would have to include a large enough time span because FDI does not
vary much over time.
3.4.2.2 Non-normality of productivity
When dealing with large cross-sections of firms such as those in this data set, the
ordinary linear squares (OLS) estimates may not be representative of the entire distribution
of the dependent variable if not identically distributed across firms. Firms may differ in
productivity for reasons that are not directly measured by my baseline model, such as
the quality characteristics of the firms, the entrepreneur’s ability, etc. The unobserved
heterogeneity may render the dependent variable ln yijk, and subsequently the error term
eijk, being indepedently but not identically distributed (i.i.d.) across firms, which violates
one of the basic assumptions of the standard regression model about the residuals of ln yijk,
in which case they become i.i.d. The non-normality of the dependent variable will further
yield the residuals non-Gaussian.
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The productivity distributions quantiles indicated skewed distributions with long tails
largely departing from normality according to the appropriate tests. The non-normality
of my dependent variables in the model will affect the distribution of the error terms as-
sumed to be normally distributed as desired by the OLS. There is strong evidence that the
error terms fail to satisfy the normality assumption, in which case OLS is asymptotically
inefficient. The non-Gaussian distributions have led to the development of alternative
estimators that place less weight on outliers and are known to be robust estimating tech-
niques.5 The quantile regression as introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) is the most
appropriate technique among this class of techniques. The quantile regression estimates
the parameters at various quantiles of the conditional distribution of yij, not merely its
conditional mean, which gives us a more complete picture of the way the level of employ-
ment and labor productivity are affected by a covariate. It provides a parsimonious way
of tracing the varying importance of foreign ownership across the entire distribution of yit.
The quantile regression is defined as
yij = x′ijβ(q) + eij
= Qq(yij) + eij, 0 < q < 1
where β(q) is the vector of parameters to be estimated for a given value of the distribution’s
quantile qe(0, 1). Qq(yij) denotes the qth quantile of the conditional distribution of yij given
the known vector of regressors xij.
However, a standard quantile regression with the fixed-effects may suffer from an inci-
dental parameters problem. The estimated coefficients do not have the same interpretation
as the standard cross-sectional quantile regression. Most standard quantile estimators
include an additive fixed-effect that separates the disturbance term and assumes the pa-
rameters do not vary based on the fixed effect. A solution has been proposed by (Canay,
2011). The solution transforms the data to get rid of the fixed-effects under the assumption
that these effects are location shifters. Canay (2011) methodology is implemented in a
two-step process. In the first step, I estimate the standard fixed-effects regression at the
5Robustness means that the distribution of an estimator or test statistic should alter only slightly when the
distribution of the error term alters slightly.
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conditional mean and using the estimated parameters from this model construct estimate




(yij − x′ij βˆu)
T
where αˆi are the estimated fixed effects, yij is the dependent variable, xij are the explanatory
variables, and βˆu are the estimated parameters from the conditional mean regression. In
the second step, I define yˆij ≡ yij− αˆi and estimate the quantile regression using the newly
defined variable as the dependent variable.
Canay (2011) shows that this estimator is consistent for large T. Canay (2011) also
proposes a bootstrap procedure for estimating the variance-covariance matrix for this es-
timator. The bootstrap method is implemented by drawing with replacement a sample of
size NT and computing the two-step estimator as described above. Repeating this process












where βˆ∗j (q) are the estimated parameters from the j
th bootstrap and the qth quantile, and




j (q). I adapt this approach to my establishment-level data set along the
dimensions of firm and sector. I follow step 1 to construct estimates for the sector fixed
effects and then use these to define the transformed dependent variable in step 2.
3.5 Empirical results
3.5.1 Productivity of domestic and foreign firms
In this section, I focus on the relationship of labor productivity on capital intensity,
ownership, size, and financial variables. As a benchmark, in a first step of the econometric
investigation, the empirical model was estimated by OLS. Results are reported in Table 3.3.
The general model checking statistics indicate that the estimated model performs well. As
mentioned in the previous section, unobserved heterogeneity and local characteristics are
likely to matter in such a large establishment-level sample. Therefore, the results presented
include industry-district fixed-effects.
In the first OLS regression of Table 3.3, I present the regression results and the test
statistics for labor productivity on the capital-labor ratio and the dummy f oreign taking
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into account foreign-ownership. In the subsequent regressions, other determinants of
productivity enter and the f oreign dummy is replaced by investor origin North and South.
Most of the significance levels and coefficient signs are not sensitive to the specification
used. The results indicate that foreign affiliates are more productive. The f oreign dummy
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in the first two regression specifica-
tions. In the subsequent regressions, I turn my attention to the investor origin variables.
In the case of North-owned foreign affiliates, the coefficient North is positive and highly
significant at the 1% level. The effect is also positive and significant for South-owned firms.
However, some difference exists between the two set of firms. The effect of North FDI
on productivity is substantially larger than South FDI. North-owned affiliates are more
productive with a premia of 5.7% compared to 2.1% for South-owned affiliates. With
respect to other determinants of productivity, the results show that firm sales and age
have a positive and significant affect on productivity in Rwandan establishments, which
indicates that firms that are large and have been around a long time enjoy higher labor
productivity. Firms that engage in cross-border trade are also more efficient. However, the
labor market variables are mostly insignificant. Even though the share of the female and
foreign workforce positively impact labor productivity, the coefficients are not significant
at the 5% level.
Nevertheless, in this case it is possible that OLS estimates are not reliable due to the
existence of non-Gaussian disturbances. There is strong evidence that the error terms
fail to satisfy the normality assumption, in which case OLS is asymptotically inefficient.
The estimated regression lines provide an estimate of the productivity distribution at the
conditional mean, which may not be representative of the entire distribution. Therefore, it
is important to test whether the estimated regression lines move away from their mean. I
estimated the regression lines separately using the lower and upper quantiles of the distri-
bution of yij = ln (Yij/Lij) and tested for the equality of coefficients between the two ends
by performing a Chow test. The value of the F-statistic (F = 108.35) resulted in rejection of
the hypothesis of equality at p = 0.00. These results imply that the specific characteristics
of the data require a more comprehensive treatment of the conditional distribution of my
dependent variable, as provided by quantile regressions.
Table 3.4 presents the regression estimates for five quantiles of the labor productivity
69
distribution. The results indicate that there are statistically significant differences in the
coefficients between and among the various quantile regression estimates for most inde-
pendent variables. The capital-labor ratio coefficient varies significantly as I move from
the upper quantile to the lower quantile of labour productivity. The most productive firms
are less sensitive to capital intensity and more sensitive to other determinants, such as
firm sales and age. With respect to foreign ownership, the effect of North ownership is
significant and increasing as I move to higher quantiles. As a result, the impact of North
FDI tends to be larger for more productive firms. On the other hand, the effect of the
developing country firms is limited. South FDI is significant at lower quantiles, which
strengthens in the center of the distribution. However, it is insignificant at higher quantiles.
With respect to the main issue of this chapter, that is the effect of f oreign (South and
North) ownership on a firm’s labor productivity, the quantile results make it clear that
North FDI matters across the productivity conditional distribution. North firms tend to be
more productive at all levels of productivity, whereas South FDI does not matter among
the very productive. It tends to have higher productivity only among the least productive.
3.5.2 FDI spillovers on labor productivity
The results so far have focused on the productive efficiency of foreign affiliates present
in Rwanda. However, there may be benefits to local firms stemming from productivity
spillovers. The intensity of foreign presence may lead to efficiency or productivity benefits
for local firms. To test the presence of productivity spillovers in the local economy, the
effect of the relative size of foreign presence on the productivity of the local firms is esti-
mated. Suppose that there are J industries indexed j = {1, ...J}, each containing Nj firms.
Suppose Mj < Nj of these firms are domestic and the remainder are foreign affiliates. Then




where ωj is weight, indicating the size of each firm. Thus, f oreign is the size-weighted
share of foreign affiliates in industry j. Three alternative measures of foreign presence are
employed: the share of foreign firms in an industry’s sales, employment, and capital. The
dependent variable is measured as the labor productivity of local firms. I begin by estimat-
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ing the general f oreign effect on domestic productivity. In step 2, I replace f oreign dummy
with South and North ownership. South is the share of sales, employment, or capital of
firms with Southern ownership and North is the corresponding share of firms with North-
ern ownership. According to the theory, I would expect the sign of North to be positive
and stronger than that of South. Recall that North FDI has superior proprietary assets,
whereas South FDI has informational advantages. The general model checking statistics
indicate that the estimated models perform well. The regressions include industry-district
fixed effects.
The least square estimates are shown in Table 3.5. The productivity of domestic firm
increases as the relative presence of foreign firms in their respective industries becomes
stronger. Foreign presence is positive and significant irrespective of the measure used.
When the effects of South and North are estimated separately, they are both positive and
significant when sales are used, but the size of the first is half that of the second. The
differences are more obvious when either employment or capital is taken into account.
North FDI has a significant and positive spillover effect when employment is used. South
FDI has a much weaker spillover effect for the corresponding share of firms. It is significant
at the 10% level. However, capital is likely the best proxy for foreign presence, since most
of the productivity spillovers stem from its use (Dimelis & Louri, 2002). As I take capital
into account, the effect of South is not only weaker than of North but is also nonsignificant.
As mentioned above, this is not entirely surprising. South FDI lacks the proprietary assets
that North FDI enjoys. The OLS effects of other explanatory variables on the productivity
of local firms are similar to those estimated when using the entire sample.
Table 3.6 reports the results from the quantile regression with the share of capital as a
variable of interest. The quantile effects of other explanatory variables are similar to that
estimated using OLS. As shown in Table 3.6, while the effect of North is always positive
and significant at the 5%, the effect of South is nonsignificant for the most productive
firms and becomes significant only for the lower 10% and 25% of the distribution. Low
productivity domestic firms are more strongly influenced by the presence of foreign firms
in general, but high productivity domestic firms are influenced only by the presence of
firms from the North. North FDI has stronger productivity spillovers on local firms,
whereas the spillover effect of South FDI is limited to lower productivity local firms.
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3.6 Conclusion
South FDI in sub-Saharan Africa has increased substantially in recent years. Under-
standing the effects of South FDI on productivity is highly policy relevant in sub-Saharan
Africa. Policymakers have encouraged South FDI as a means to encourage productivity
growth and technology transfer. However, these positive externalities are neither guar-
anteed nor automatic. South FDI may lack proprietary assets that North FDI has. Three
main hypotheses are tested in this chapter: (a) Is labor productivity influenced by North
and South FDI? (b) Does North and South FDI affect productivity spillovers? (c) Is the
effect of North and South FDI different at various points of the productivity conditional
distribution?
A sample of 7,707 private sector firms (5% of which are foreign) operating in Rwanda
in 2014 is used. The empirical results provided by the analysis support the theoretical
proposition that foreign ownership leads to more efficient production. However, shifts
in the level of productivity vary based on investor origin. North FDI raises productivity
by 13.4% compared to South FDI’s 5.1%. Thus, productivity in an economy is improved
with the entry of South FDI, and even more so with North FDI. Furthermore, North FDI
raises productivity across the productivity conditional distribution, whereas South FDI is
on average more productive among the least productive firms. We can interpret the results
as evidence that South FDI does not matter among the very productive firms. It is among
the least productive firms that South FDI has superior efficiency by causing a positive
productivity shift.
The chapter also measures the productivity spillovers stemming from North and South
FDI and benefiting local firms. The findings agree with the theory that the productivity of
local firms increases as the presence of foreign affiliates becomes stronger. When industry’s
sales are taken into account, the positive spillovers accrued from North FDI are 4% greater
than South FDI. However, South FDI does not produce any significant spillovers when
industry’s fixed capital is considered. Fixed capital is considered as the best proxy for
foreign presence. The quantile effects use industry’s fixed capital as a variable of interest.
The results reveal that low productivity local firms benefit from the presence of both North
and South FDI. High productivity local firms are influenced only by North FDI.
On the policy front, suggestions with respect to attracting inward FDI following such
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findings must take into account that both North and South FDI have varying effects on host
economies. North or South FDI are estimated to be more efficient, thus causing an overall
shift in the general efficiency level of the host economy. Nevertheless, North FDI should
be favored if technology transfer and spillovers leading to efficiency gains in local firms
are pursued. It should be emphasized though that such policy suggestions refer to small,
open, and developing host economies and depend on the availability and capability of
local partners as well as the institutional framework available. Differences in the responses
between high and low productivity local firms should also be taken into account in the
design of the appropriate policy.
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Figure 3.1. FDI inflows in Rwanda
Figure 3.2. The quantiles of Y/L distribution and the normal distribution
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Table 3.1. Selected indicators of FDI in Rwanda (%)
Indicator 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
FDI inflows/GFCFa 16.0 36.4 14.6 28.0 16.7
FDI inflows/GDP 3.5 7.6 3.1 6.1 3.9
FDI stock/GDP 7.9 12.9 12.9 17.4 12.8
Return on assets of non-residents 2.2 2.8 1.2 2.4 6.8
Return on equity of non-residents 9.1 13.4 19.5 20.6 16.1
aGross fixed capital formation
Source: National Institute of Statistics Rwanda
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Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics
Domestic Foreign
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Manufacturing firms
Log of capital-labor ratio 5.18 3.01 6.15 3.22
Log of sales 13.51 5.03 12.67 3.30
Age 6.94 4.82 4.29 2.04
Female employment 0.61 0.52 0.40 0.37
Foreign employment 0.1 0.11 0.26 0.13
Trade 0.20 0.35 0.31 0.55
Services firms
Log of capital-labor ratio 2.87 1.14 4.29 2.08
Log of sales 11.70 3.82 12.30 1.82
Age 4.26 2.09 2.18 1.20
Female employment 0.32 0.25 0.17 0.12
Foreign employment 0.0 0.05 0.08 0.11
Trade 0.06 0.28 0.12 0.35
Agricultural firms
Log of capital-labor ratio 1.39 1.08 3.64 1.70
Log of sales 9.41 2.27 8.32 1.29
Age 5.81 1.02 1.79 1.13
Female employment 0.14 0.21 0.10 0.28
Foreign employment 0.0 0.01 0.02 0.01
Trade 0.02 0.33 0.08 0.20
Notes: The establishment-level sample is composed of 6,651 establishments, of which 476 (7.16%) are foreign
affiliates. Of 476 foreign affiliates, 211 are North-owned and 265 are South-owned. The services sector accounts
for the largest share of enterprises. The available establishment-level variables include value of establishment
sales, establishment age, capital-labor ratio, share of female in total employment, share of foreign in total
employment, and trade.
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Table 3.3. Productivity effects and foreign ownership using OLS estimates
Dependent variable is natural log of physical product of labor (ln yijk)































































Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,651 6,651 6,651 6,651
R-squared 0.12 0.34 0.34 0.35
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinear-
ity has been tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels;
*** significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 3.4. Productivity effects and foreign ownership using quantile estimates
Dependent variable is natural log of physical product of labor (ln yijk)




























































































Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,651 6,651 6,651 6,651 6,651
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinear-
ity has been tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels;
*** significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 3.5. Productivity spillovers and foreign ownership using OLS estimates










































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,175 6,175 6,175 6,175 6,175 6,175
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinear-
ity has been tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels;
*** significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 3.6. Productivity spillovers and foreign ownership using quantile estimates
Dependent variable is natural log of physical product of labor (ln yijk) of domestic firms
























































































Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,175 6,175 6,175 6,175 6,175
Pseudo R-squared 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinear-
ity has been tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels;











Annual bilateral foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows from country i to country j at t.
The definition of FDI is as proposed in Balance
of Payments Manual: Fifth Edition (BPM5) by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A for-
eign investor requires a 10% or more of equity




GDPit Gross domestic product (GDP) of source coun-
try i at t
(See Appendix B)
GDPjt Gross domestic product (GDP) of host country
j at t
(See Appendix B)





Distance in kilometers from country i to coun-
try j using the per capita GDP share of country














1 if the same language is spoken by at least 9%






Average years of secondary, higher and total
schooling in the total population over 25 years






Annual percentage change in consumer price






Average rank. A lower value means ease of
starting a business. The index measures the
paid-in minimum capital requirement, num-
ber of procedures, time and cost for a small-
to medium-sized limited liability company to





Average rank. A lower value means ease of
dealing with construction permits. Tracks the
procedures, time and cost to build a ware-
house—including obtaining necessary the li-
censes and permits, submitting all required no-
tifications, requesting and receiving all neces-






Average rank. A lower value means ease of
obtaining credit. The topic explores two sets
of issues—the strength of credit reporting sys-
tems and the effectiveness of collateral and







Average rank. A lower value means ease of
trading across borders. Measures the time
and cost (excluding tariffs) associated with
three sets of procedures—documentary com-
pliance, border compliance and domestic trans-
port—within the overall process of exporting or





Average rank. A lower value means ease
of contract enforcement. Measures the time
and cost for resolving a commercial dispute
through a local first-instance court. In addi-
tion, this year it introduces a new measure, the
quality of judicial processes index, evaluating
whether each economy has adopted a series of
good practices that promote quality and effi-







The mean value of six available measures of
institutional qualiy, with higher values indicat-
ing good institutional quality. The six measures
include voice and accountability, political sta-
bility and absence of violence, government ef-
fectiveness, regulatory quality, control for cor-














The extent to which a country’s citizens are able
to participate in selecting their government, as
well as freedom of expression, freedom of asso-













The likelihood that the government will be
destabilized or overthrown by violent means,
including political violence and terrorism. Also
includes risk to the incumbent government













The quality of the bureaucracy which might act











The ability of the government to implement





















The mean value of four dummy variables, with
higher values indicating more capital controls.
The variables include exchange arrangements,
payment restrictions, surrender or repatriation









The sum of exports and imports of goods and







Financial market development in country j at t
is proxied by domestic credit provided to pri-









1 if country i and country j belong to the same









Tax burden in country j at t is proxied by total
tax rate as a share of commercial profits. Mea-
sures the amount of taxes and mandatory con-
tributions payable by businesses after account-
ing for allowable deductions and exemptions








1 if the legal system in country j has been influ-
enced by the French civil code and legal tradi-
tion.










Notes: The definition of North used in this study follows the UNCTAD (2005) country classification. The
donor countries belonging to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) plus Greece and Ireland are
classified here as being in the North. Conversely, UNCTAD (2005) included Hong Kong (China), the Republic
of Korea and Singapore in the South, even though they are now net contributors to the World Bank Group and
are not eligible for loans anymore. The definition of South follows the UNCTAD (2005) country classificaion
which includes both developing countries and economies in transition.
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Bank (2014), and na-
tional sources
Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras,
India, Iran, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru,
Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Tai-
wan Province of China, Tunisia, Ukraine,
Uruguay, and Zambia
Central banks and other
national sources; Bal-
ance of payments statis-
tics
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, El Salvador,
Eritrea, Guatemala, Georgia, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Macedonia, Mali, Mongo-
lia, Mozambique, Nepal, Serbia and Montene-
gro, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Yemen
ASEAN (2014) Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Myanmar, Laos, South Korea, Sin-
gapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
OECD statistics (2014)
and the Eurostat’s “New
Cronos” (2014)
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Canada,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States, Mexico, and Turkey
APPENDIX C
ESTIMATION OF QUANTILE PARAMETERS








2q if ei > 0
2(1− q) if ei < 0
}
For q = 0.5, I obtain the median and problem Eq. (C.1) is equivalent to the problem of
minimum absolute deviations. For the estimation of quantiles other than the median, the
residuals are weighted appropriately depending on whether they are positive or negative.
The problem was solved by the linear programming algorithm suggested by Armstrong et
al. (1979). Similar computational techniques were also suggested by Koenker and Bassett
(1978).
The elements β(q) were estimated using the method suggested by Koenker and Bassett
(1978). However, in cases of heteroskedastic errors, the estimated standard errors are
understated by this method. For this reason, robust standard errors were obtained by
using the option of bootstrapping procedures introduced by Gould (1997).




βˆ′(qi, βˆ′(q2), . . . , βˆ′(qm)
⌋
, 0 < q1 < q2 < . . . < qm < 1
The properties of the estimators βˆ(q) as well as the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the uniqueness of δˆ are given by Koenker and Bassett (1978). From an empirical point of
view, then the important question that arises is to test statistically how different the above
estimated parameter vectors βˆ(q) are across the various quantile regressions. To perform
such hypotheses tests, we need the entire variance-covariance matrix of δˆ. This can only
87
be obtained asymptotically and was implemented in this chapter using a bootstrapped
sampling method.
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